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This dissertation examines changes in managers’ financial reporting around two major corporate 
financing events, accelerated share repurchases (ASRs) and seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). 
The first essay provides evidence on managerial motives for initiating ASRs, a recent and 
important innovation in repurchase methods, by examining managers’ financial reporting 
behavior around ASRs and post-ASR performance. ASR firms report positive discretionary 
accruals in the quarter of the repurchase announcement and that the upward earnings 
management increases with the percentage of equity repurchased, initiation of the repurchase 
earlier in the quarter, and CEO’s bonus compensation as a fraction of total compensation. There 
is however a negative association between the ASR announcement returns and pre-repurchase 
positive discretionary accruals, suggesting that investors perceive the positive discretionary 
accruals as the result of managerial opportunism (i.e., boosting EPS) rather than managerial 
optimism (i.e., signaling undervaluation). Further, ASR announcements are not followed by an 
increase in operating performance. There is also no evidence of positive long-run abnormal stock 
performance during the post-ASR period. The results suggest that managers use ASRs along 
with positive discretionary accruals to manage reported EPS rather than to signal their favorable 
private information about firms’ prospects.   
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 The second essay examines the relation between firms’ financial constraints and their 
financial reporting during periods when they attempt to raise equity capital. Specifically, I 
investigate whether financially constrained firms tend to manage their earnings more 
aggressively around SEOs as compared to financially unconstrained firms. By using different 
measures of financial constraints, I document that constrained issuers, which cannot credibly 
signal the absence of aggressive earnings management, report higher income-increasing accruals 
than unconstrained issuers. I also find that investors correctly conjecture this greater earnings 
inflation and adjust issuers’ stock prices accordingly at the time of the offering. The evidence 
suggests that the aggressive earnings management by constrained issuers is not simply the result 
of managerial opportunism but rather a rational response to anticipated market behavior at 
offering announcements.  
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1.0    CHAPTER 1: MANAGERIAL OPTIMISM VERSUS OPPORTUNISM AS A 
MOTIVATION FOR REPURCHASES: THE CASE OF ACCELERATED SHARE 
REPURCHASES 
 
 
 
1.1    INTRODUCTION 
  
 
Managers often cite undervaluation as the motivation for repurchases (Brav et al. 2005). That is, 
a repurchase announcement communicates to the market that the firm’s shares are undervalued 
and thus, constitute a good investment. This also seems to be the case with accelerated share 
repurchases (ASRs)― a recent and important innovation in repurchase methods, which emerged 
as a significant part of firms’ repurchase programs, amounting to $131 billion between 2004 and 
2008 and representing 26% of total repurchase program announcements in 2007 (Bargeron, 
Kulchania, and Thomas, 2011).1 While investment bankers, too, argue that the biggest attraction 
of ASRs is communicating a stronger signal as ASR firms actually repurchase their shares rather 
than just announce a potential buyback, financial press has pointed out a controversial motivation 
for ASRs, managing earnings per share (EPS).2
 The goal of this article is to distinguish between managerial optimism (i.e., signaling 
undervaluation) and opportunism (i.e., boosting EPS) as a motive for ASRs by examining 
managers’ financial reporting behavior around the repurchase, as well as the post-repurchase 
  
                                                 
1 Bargeron et al. (2011) report “undervaluation” as the most commonly stated motivation (60 percent) among the 
ASR firms that explicitly state a motivation for the repurchase.  
2 See, for instance, the May 30, 2007, Financial Times article “Speeded-up buyback wheeze provokes fair share of 
criticism”, the May 30, 2007, Wall Street Journal article “IBM Hones the Stock Buyback”, and the January 31, 
2006, Wall Street Journal article “Buybacks via loophole can have hidden cost”.  
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performance of ASR firms. Previous research suggests that analyzing the financial reporting 
behavior around share repurchases may provide valuable insights into the managerial intent 
behind repurchases (see, for instance, Louis and White (2007) for tender offers and Gong, Louis, 
and Sun (2008) for open market repurchases).  
 Firms undertaking ASRs commit themselves to buy a specified amount of shares through 
a financial intermediary. Specifically, an ASR firm enters into a contract with an investment 
bank which delivers a block of borrowed shares to the firm immediately and receives an initial 
cash amount based on a previously agreed per share price. The contract between the two parties 
is then settled at a later point in time once the investment bank completes the repurchase of the 
firm’s shares on the open market and the final cost of the repurchase is determined based on the 
volume-weighted average price of the open market repurchases conducted by the bank.  An 
interesting feature of ASRs is that under current accounting rules, the transaction results in an 
immediate reduction of the outstanding shares used to calculate the weighted average number of 
shares for EPS. Further, current accounting for ASRs does not require firms to record in income 
any additional cost arising from post-repurchase price increase (Dickinson, Kimmel, and 
Warfield 2012). Thus, ASR firms realize a quick boost in EPS, while any losses associated with 
the ASR contract bypass the income statement and are reported in equity. This unique structure 
of ASRs gave rise to discussions as to whether firms use them primarily as a signaling or 
earnings management device.  
 The evidence in this paper supports the earnings management hypothesis. Specifically, I 
find that firms undertaking ASRs report significantly positive discretionary accruals (DA) in the 
quarter of the repurchase (median DA0 = 0.44% of total assets) and insignificant DA in the 
quarter prior to the repurchase (median DA-1 = 0.04% of total assets). Further, the upward 
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earnings management in the quarter of the ASR announcement increases with the percentage of 
outstanding equity repurchased through the ASR transaction. This finding suggests that ASR 
firms’ tendency to increase the numerator of EPS through discretionary accruals is positively 
associated with the magnitude of repurchase-driven reduction in the denominator of EPS. This 
result is robust to controlling for several factors that may affect the use of discretionary accruals 
such as analyst following, leverage, and litigation risk, as well as using the instrumental variable 
approach. Another piece of evidence consistent with the earnings management hypothesis is that 
firms initiating ASRs earlier rather than later in the quarter (which results in a greater reduction 
in the weighted average number of shares) report higher positive discretionary accruals in the 
repurchase quarter. I also document that that the magnitude of discretionary accruals reported in 
the ASR quarter is positively associated with CEO’s pre-ASR bonus compensation (as a fraction 
of total compensation).   
 Previous research suggests that upward earnings management around such corporate 
events as repurchases and stock splits may also be an indication of managerial optimism (rather 
than opportunism). In fact, Louis and White (2007) find that firms engaging in fixed-price tender 
offers report positive but insignificant abnormal accruals (i.e., 0.15% of total assets) prior to the 
repurchase and that the announcement returns for fixed-price repurchases are positively related 
to pre-repurchase discretionary accruals. They conclude that managers use their reporting 
discretion optimistically to reinforce the undervaluation signal conveyed through fixed-price 
repurchases. My results are inconsistent with this signaling hypothesis. I find a negative relation 
between the ASR announcement returns and positive discretionary accruals reported prior to the 
repurchase, indicating that investors perceive income-increasing accruals reported by ASR firms 
as the result of opportunistic behavior rather than managerial optimism.  
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 The results also reveal that while ASR firms consistently beat the analyst consensus 
estimate (four months prior to the earnings announcement) during the pre-repurchase quarters, 
they either miss or just meet the consensus forecast during the post-repurchase period. Further, 
although ASR firms usually perform better than their industry peers both in the pre- and post-
repurchase period, they do not exhibit a significant improvement in their operating performance 
during the post-repurchase period. Similarly, there is no indication of positive abnormal stock 
performance of ASR firms during the 12- and 24-month period following the announcement. 
Overall, the decline in the post-ASR EPS performance, along with the lack of improvement in 
operating and stock return performance, casts significant doubt on the argument that managers 
initiate ASRs to signal their favorable private information. 
 The present study contributes to the literature on share repurchases, in particular the 
growing body of research on ASRs. Bargeron et al. (2011), for instance, find that the probability 
of a firm including an ASR in its repurchase program increases with the liquidity of the firm’s 
shares and decreases with the volatility of the firm’s share price. A recent paper by Dickinson et 
al. (2012) documents that the market discounts post-repurchase earnings of ASR firms due to 
uncertainty regarding the actual cost of the repurchase, which is not known until the investment 
bank completes the repurchase of the company’s shares on the open market. An earlier study by 
Michel et al. (2010) reveals that ASR firms suffer from a poor stock return performance during 
the nine-month period following the repurchase. This study complements and extends prior 
studies by providing insights into the managerial motives for initiating ASRs. My results indicate 
that managers use ASRs along with positive discretionary accruals opportunistically to increase 
reported EPS in the quarter of the repurchase. Upward earnings management bundled with the 
repurchase may help managers meet or beat EPS targets and thus, enable them to strengthen their 
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positions within the company and maintain their reputation in the executive labor market 
(Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal, 2005), as well as secure their compensation (Cheng, Harford, 
and Zhang, 2010). 
 This paper is also related to prior research examining managers’ financial reporting 
behavior to infer managerial motives behind repurchases. Gong et al. (2008a), for instance, find 
that firms deflate their earnings around OMRs via negative discretionary accruals to depress 
stock price and reduce the overall cost of the repurchase, suggesting that these companies, on 
average, are not concerned with either boosting EPS or signaling undervaluation. This result also 
holds true for firms undertaking Dutch-auction repurchases (Louis and White 2007). On the 
other hand, increasing EPS seems to be a relevant concern for firms initiating ASRs.  
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature on 
accelerated share repurchases, discusses the role of earnings management around repurchases 
and develops testable hypotheses. Section 3 describes the variable measurement process. Section 
4 discusses the dataset. Section 5 describes the empirical methodology and presents the results. 
Section 6 reports the results of additional analysis. Section 7 concludes the paper with the 
discussion of the importance of the findings. 
 
 
 
1.2    RELATED LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
 
Under an ASR contract, a firm repurchases a block of its shares immediately from an 
intermediary, typically an investment bank which borrows the shares from investors, and the 
investment bank receives an initial cash payment determined based on the current share price. At 
the same time, the firm enters into a forward contract to protect the investment bank against loss 
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on its short position. During the post-announcement period, the investment bank purchases the 
shares in the market to replace borrowed shares and the ASR contract is settled based on the 
volume-weighted average price paid by the investment bank to purchase the specified amount of 
shares. If the investment bank purchases the shares at a total cost that is less than the initial 
payment, the firm can choose to receive additional shares or cash payment from the investment 
bank. On the other hand, if the total cost of open market repurchases by the investment bank 
exceeds the initial amount paid by the firm, the investment bank is compensated either by cash or 
new shares issued by the firm. Contractual caps are therefore used by some ASR firms to limit 
the amount of the cost stemming from post-repurchase price increase beyond a certain level. 
However, the use of such contractual caps of course increases the cost of the repurchase.3
 As outlined above, an ASR is a fast and costly way to repurchase shares. Thus, it is a 
credible commitment on the part of managers, increasing its attractiveness for firms trying to 
send credible signals of undervaluation to market participants. Another important yet 
controversial feature of ASRs is that it leads to an immediate decrease in the number of shares 
used to calculate EPS, resulting in a quick, artificial improvement in the reported earnings 
performance when there is actually none. Since the execution of an ASR reduces the number of 
shares outstanding starting with the day following the transaction, undertaking the repurchase 
 
Another potential cost associated with ASRs is that repurchasing firm compensates the 
investment bank for the dividends declared during the period until the repurchase is completed.  
                                                 
3 For instance, Family Dollar notes that the company paid $1.3 million cap premium plus $0.2 million as 
commissions and fees for its $199.7 million ASR transaction announced on October 4th, 2005. The cap was equal to 
115% of the investment bank’s average repurchase price (i.e., the bank is not compensated for the price increase that 
is above 15% of the initial price). It is worth stressing that information on investment banking fees for ASR 
transactions is not commonly available and that Family Dollar is one of the few companies in my sample which 
provide such information.  
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earlier in the quarter leads to a higher reduction in the weighted average number of shares and 
thus, a greater boost in EPS.  
 As opposed to its impact on EPS, the potential costs associated with the settlement of the 
ASR contract are not realized for a certain period of time, since it usually takes several months 
for the investment bank to repurchase the specified amount of shares.4 In addition, any losses 
incurred on the forward contract are recorded in equity and thus, have no impact on reported 
earnings.5
 As noted at the outset of the paper, managers and investment bankers emphasize the 
signaling role of ASRs, while potential earnings management role of these transactions has also 
gathered considerable attention, particularly in financial press. Below I outline my hypotheses 
related both motivations and conduct several empirical tests to distinguish between the two.  
 This is because under current rules, firms initiating ASRs have the option to settle the 
forward contract using either shares or cash. If the contract were only to be settled in cash (like 
currency forward contracts), ASR firms would have to mark the contact to market and recognize 
any potential losses on the income statement. On the other hand, the contracts to be settled in 
shares are not marked to market. Due to this unique structure, an ASR provides immediate 
financial reporting benefits, while its potential costs are delayed and bypass income when they 
are eventually recorded on the company’s books.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 Bargeron et al. (2011) note that the average number of days to settlement in their sample is 140 days.   
5 The FASB’s Emerging Issues Task Force (EITF) Issue 99-7 (“Accounting for an Accelerated Share Repurchase 
Program) outlines the details of accounting procedures related to an ASR transaction. The task force concluded that 
a firm undertaking an ASR should account for the repurchase as two separate transactions: (1) as shares of common 
stock acquired in a treasury stock transaction recorded on the acquisition date and (2) as a forward contract indexed 
to its own common stock.  It is also noted in the issue that the settlement of the forward contract would be recorded 
in equity.  
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1.2.1    Earnings Management Hypothesis 
 
 
A number of studies have examined the earnings management role of share repurchases (e.g., 
Bens et al., 2003; Hribar et al., 2006). For instance, Brav et al. (2005) report that 75% of the 
executives participated in their survey consider the increase in EPS as an important factor 
influencing their share repurchase decisions. Relatedly, Bens et al. (2003) find that executives try 
to undo the dilutive effect of outstanding employee stock options on EPS through increasing the 
amount of their firms’ share repurchases. They also find that executives enhance their firms’ 
share repurchase programs when the current level of earnings is not high enough to sustain EPS 
growth. Similarly, Kahle (2002) finds that firms with higher number of exercisable employee 
stock options are more likely to repurchase shares rather than increase dividends and that the 
amount of shares actually repurchased also increases with the number of exercisable options. 
Furthermore, Hribar et al. (2006) document that accretive repurchases are significantly more 
common among firms which would have missed earnings forecasts if they had not repurchased 
their shares. Finally, Myers, Myers, and Skinner (2007) find that firms reporting long strings 
(i.e., at least 20 quarters) of consecutive increases in EPS seem to strategically time their share 
repurchases not to experience declines in EPS.  
 The notion that share repurchases are used as earnings management devices is in line 
with previous studies documenting that executives manage earnings to sustain earnings growth, 
make at least last year’s or quarter’s earnings, meet analysts’ consensus forecast, and report 
positive profits (e.g., Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; DeGeorge et al., 1999; Das and Zhang, 
2003). Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal (2005) point out that executives are concerned with 
meeting EPS targets due to several motivations such as stock price driven motivation, 
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stakeholder motivations, compensation driven motivation and career concerns.6 For instance, 
they note that 86% of executives participated in their survey agree that meeting EPS benchmarks 
builds credibility with the capital markets. Furthermore, most participants think that not being 
able to meet EPS benchmarks is considered “managerial failure” by the executive labor market. 
The authors also highlight that severe investor response to small EPS misses (Skinner and Sloan, 
2002) can result from the fact that investors tend to interpret a firm’s inability to find one or two 
cents to meet EPS target as a sign of hidden financial or operational problems at the firm. 
Consequently, they find that executives do not refrain from making sacrifices to meet EPS 
targets, which enables them to avoid negative investor reaction, as well as securing their 
compensation (Cheng, Harford, and Zhang, 2010).7
 I refer to the idea that firms repurchase their shares due to EPS related concerns as the 
earnings management hypothesis (EMH). This hypothesis posits that repurchasing firms tend to 
bundle income-increasing accruals with repurchases to report higher EPS. As Bens et al. (2003, 
p. 55) succinctly put it: “If important earnings benchmarks are typically denominated in EPS 
terms (as seems likely), it is natural to expect corporate executives to manage the denominator as 
well as the numerator of this ratio.” Thus, the EMH predicts that ASR firms engage in upward 
earnings management around the repurchase and the extent of upward earnings management is 
positively associated with the amount of equity repurchased through the ASR transaction. 
However, if the announcement of an ASR alerts investors to managers’ motivation to boost 
  
                                                 
6 For instance, related to the compensation motivation, Matsunaga and Park (2001) document that missing quarterly 
earnings benchmarks (i.e., earnings for the same quarter of last year or consensus analyst forecast) has a significant 
incremental adverse effect on CEOs’ annual cash bonuses, providing them with economic incentives to manage 
earnings upward.  
7 Cheng et al. (2010) find that share repurchases increase CEOs’ likelihood of receiving a bonus, as well as the 
magnitude of the bonus payment, when CEOs’ bonus plans are tied to EPS performance. Furthermore, their 
examination of the proxy statements filed by repurchasing firms suggests that the compensation committees 
generally do not adjust for the impact of repurchase while deciding whether EPS goals are achieved (though only a 
small fraction of proxies, less than 0.5% of the total sample size, mentions the impact of repurchase on EPS). 
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quarterly EPS, there should be a negative association between positive discretionary accruals and 
ASR announcement returns. Further, the EMH predicts that firms undertaking ASRs earlier 
rather than later in the quarter (which results in a greater reduction in the weighted average 
number of shares) report higher discretionary accruals. Finally, the lack of positive abnormal 
operating and stock return performance accompanied with a decline in EPS performance during 
the post-ASR period would be consistent with the EMH. Table 1.1 summarizes these predictions.  
 
1.2.2    Signaling Undervaluation Hypothesis  
 
 
Managers’ use of positive discretionary accruals around the repurchase is not conclusive 
evidence that they are concerned about EPS because it may also be an indication of signaling 
motivation. For instance, Louis and White (2007) find that firms initiating fixed-price 
repurchases report positive (but insignificant) discretionary accruals prior to the repurchase. The 
authors contend that managers use income-increasing accruals to reinforce the undervaluation 
signal conveyed through the repurchase. That is, since positive earnings management prior to a 
repurchase is a costly signal (due to increased cost of repurchase), managers will inflate earnings 
only when they are highly optimistic about their firms’ prospects and try to signal their optimism 
to the market participants. This argument is in line with the previous studies suggesting that 
managers use discretionary accruals to signal private information (e.g., Guay, Kothari, and 
Watts, 1996; Louis and Robinson, 2005).8
                                                 
8 For instance, Louis and Robinson (2005) find that managers report income-increasing accruals in the quarter prior 
to stock split announcements to communicate their favorable beliefs to market. The authors also point out that the 
market correctly prices positive abnormal accruals at the announcement of the stock split as there is a positive 
relation between abnormal accruals and announcement returns.  
 Consistent with the signaling motivation, Louis and 
White (2007) also document a positive relation between the pre-repurchase discretionary 
accruals and announcement returns for the fixed-price repurchase tender offers. Furthermore, 
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they document that repurchasing firms with the highest accruals experience the largest long-run 
positive abnormal returns following the repurchase.  
I refer to the idea that managers initiate repurchases to communicate their favorable 
private information to the market participants as the signaling undervaluation hypothesis (SUH). 
Similar to the EMH, the SUH also posits that positive discretionary accruals and repurchases act 
as complements. Hence, it predicts that ASR firms report positive discretionary accruals around 
the repurchase and the magnitude of discretionary accruals increases with the size of the 
repurchase. That is, ASR firms’ desire to signal undervaluation through repurchase of a large 
block of shares should be positively associated with their desire to reinforce this signal with 
positive discretionary accruals. However, as opposed to the EMH, the SUH predicts that ASR 
firms reporting higher positive discretionary accruals will experience higher announcement 
returns. In other words, if investors perceive positive discretionary accruals as the result of 
managerial optimism rather than managerial opportunism, there should be a positive relation 
between ASR announcement returns and positive discretionary accruals. Also, assuming that 
market-to-book ratio proxies for overvaluation of an equity as some argue (e.g., Baker, Foley, 
and Wurgler, 2009), observing a negative relation between market-to-book ratio and 
discretionary accruals would provide support for the SUH. Further, the SUH predicts that firms 
undertaking ASRs experience positive abnormal stock return and operating performance 
following the repurchase.  
 
1.2.3    Alternative hypotheses   
 
 
Inconsistent with the earnings improvement and signaling motivations, a recent study by Gong et 
al. (2008a) finds that firms repurchasing their shares on the open market manage their earnings 
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downward around the announcement quarter. The authors also document that the discretionary 
accruals reported by OMR firms are negatively associated with both the percentage of equity 
repurchased and CEO equity ownership. Thus, they maintain that the motivation of deflating 
earnings around OMRs is to depress the firm’s stock price and acquire the shares at a lower cost. 
In a related study, Louis and White (2007) find that firms undertaking Dutch-auction repurchases 
also report significantly negative abnormal accruals in the quarter prior to the announcement 
quarter. Further, the authors find no relation between pre-repurchase discretionary accruals and 
announcement returns, indicating that investors fail to undo the stock price impact of the 
downward earnings management. They conclude that firms undertaking Dutch-auction 
repurchases also try to deflate their stock prices through managing earnings downward prior to 
the announcement and thereby, reduce the cost of repurchase. This “cost minimization 
hypothesis” posits that managers conducting repurchases for reasons other than boosting EPS or 
signaling undervalution (e.g., adjusting towards target leverage, distributing excess cash) have 
incentives to bundle income-decreasing discretionary accruals with repurchases. If this argument 
holds true for ASRs, one would expect that managers report negative discretionary accruals 
around the ASR and that the reported discretionary accruals decrease with the percentage of 
shares repurchased.  
 Previous research also proposes rational explanations for changes in managers’ financial 
reporting behavior around corporate events. For instance, Shivakumar’s (2000) “managerial 
response hypothesis” posits that since managers cannot credibly signal the absence of positive 
earnings management around SEOs, investors discount issuers’ stock prices at the announcement 
and thus, managers rationally manage earnings upward. However, the managerial response 
hypothesis is not suitable for the cases where there is uncertainty among market participants 
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regarding the manager’s reporting objective (Fischer and Verrecchia 2000). As discussed above, 
previous studies document conflicting reporting objectives around share repurchases and thus, in 
the ASR context there would be ex-ante uncertainty about the manager’s reporting behavior. For 
instance, if investors believe that ASR firms would try to boost EPS via positive discretionary 
accruals and managers cannot credibly signal the absence of upward earnings management, 
managers’ best response is to report positive discretionary accruals. Interestingly, the same 
argument applies for downward earnings management as well since managers may tend to use 
their reporting discretion to reduce the cost of the repurchase and an ASR firm with such 
motivation is expected to report negative, rather than positive, discretionary accruals. As a result, 
the managerial response hypothesis does not make a clear prediction about the sign of the 
discretionary accruals around ASRs. Thus, I will not discuss this hypothesis further in the paper.  
 
 
 
1.3    VARIABLE MEASUREMENT 
 
 
I measure discretionary accruals by using a modified version of Jones (1991) model as suggested 
by Louis and White (2007), Gong et al. (2008a, 2008b), and Louis, Robinson, and Sbaraglia 
(2008). Specifically, for each industry (two-digit SIC code) and calendar quarter, I estimate 
Equation (1) using all the firms that have necessary accounting data on COMPUSTAT and total 
assets greater than $1M.    
TAi = � βj−1
4
j=1
𝐹𝑄𝑗,𝑖 + β4ΔSALEi + β5PPEi + β6LTAi +β7ASSETi + εi             (1) 
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where, TA is total accruals calculated according to the cash flow approach (i.e., income before 
extraordinary items minus cash flow from operations (IBCY – (OANCFY – XIDOCY))9
 Consistent with Gong et al. (2008a, 2008b), all the variables, including the dummy 
variables for fiscal quarters and ASSET, are scaled by total assets at the beginning of the quarter. 
Due to scaling, ASSET variable is equal to one for all observations, allowing estimation of the 
model with the standard intercept. To mitigate the effects of outliers, for each calendar-quarter, I 
delete the top and bottom one percentiles of the deflated TA, ΔSALE, PPE and LTA. I also 
require there be at least 20 observations in each industry and calendar quarter to accurately 
estimate the regression coefficients.  
; FQj is a 
dummy variable which takes value of one for fiscal quarter j and zero otherwise; ΔSALE is the 
quarterly change in sales (SALEQ); PPE is property, plant, and equipment (PPENTQ) at the end 
of the quarter; LTA is the lag of total accruals; ASSET is total assets (ATQ) at the beginning of 
the quarter; ε is the regression residual.  
  Equation (2) estimates expected total accruals using the coefficient estimates obtained 
from Equation (1) with an adjustment for the change in accounts receivables (Dechow, Sloan and 
Sweeney, 1995): 
ETAi = � β�j−1
4
j=1
𝐹𝑄𝑗,𝑖 + β�4(ΔSALEi - ΔARi) + β�5PPEi + β�6LTAi + β�7ASSETi         (2) 
where, β�0 to β�7 are the estimated coefficients from Equation (1); ETA is the expected total 
accruals; ΔAR is the quarterly change in accounts receivable (RECTQ). Estimated abnormal 
accruals is the difference between the total accruals and expected total accruals.  
 Finally, Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005) show that performance-adjusted accruals are 
well-specified and yield powerful tests. Therefore, I adjust the estimated abnormal accruals for 
                                                 
9 Compustat (quarterly) variable names are in parentheses. 
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performance. Specifically, following previous studies (e.g., Louis, 2004; Louis and Robinson, 
2005; Gong et al., 2008a), I build four portfolios, each of which consists of at least five firms, by 
sorting the data into quartiles based on return-on-assets (i.e., operating income (OIBDPQ) 
divided by cash-adjusted total assets) from the four quarters prior to the ASR. The performance-
adjusted discretionary accruals for a sample firm are the estimated abnormal accruals for the firm 
minus the median estimated abnormal accruals for its respective industry-performance-matched 
portfolio. As suggested by Gong et al. (2008a, 2008b), the portfolio benchmarking approach 
allows researchers to control not only for performance but also for random effects stemming 
from other events which may impact accruals or other managerial incentives to engage in 
earnings management.  
 
 
 
1.4    SAMPLE FORMATION AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
 
Since Bargeron et al. (2011) note that ASR transactions gained momentum after 2003, I limit my 
sample period to 2004 through 2007. ASR firms included in the sample are identified through 
inspection of company filings (e.g., 10-K, 10-Q, 8-K, etc.) which are available in the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Edgar online database. First, I used Edgar Full-Text 
search to identify all the filings that mention accelerated share repurchases. Then, I manually 
checked every filing to gather relevant information (e.g., transaction date, number of shares 
repurchased) about each ASR transaction. However, since Edgar-Full Text searchable database 
includes a rolling window of the previous four years of SEC filings, I was able to search only 
filings dated after July 2005. Therefore, to identify ASRs undertaken between January 2004 and 
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July 2005, I searched Factiva for news stories that mention an ASR transaction.10 I also used 
news stories identified through Factiva for the rest of the sample period to supplement my 
inspection of SEC filings. Finally, I searched for ASR announcements through other internet 
sources and databases such as ABI/INFORM and Google.com. I recorded the ASR transaction 
date reported in the SEC filings as the announcement date. However, if I was not able to locate 
the actual transaction date from the company reports, I used the earliest day in which the ASR 
transaction appeared in the news. As a result of my search, I was able to identify 217 ASR 
transactions conducted between 2004 and 2007.11
 Table 1.2 reports the sample characteristics. Panel A presents the year and fiscal quarter 
distribution of ASRs. The yearly distribution shows that ASR transactions have become 
increasingly popular over the sample period and reached a high of 81 in 2007, representing 
45.51% of the sample. The fiscal quarter distribution shows that 71.91% of ASRs are undertaken 
during the interim quarters. Furthermore, the median number of days between the initiation of 
the ASR and the end of the fiscal quarter is 42 days. Panel B summarizes several characteristics 
of ASR firms including total assets (ATQ), market value of equity (PRCCQ x CSHOQ), market-
to-book ratio ((PRCCQ x CSHOQ)/CEQQ), leverage ratio ((DLCQ+DLTTQ)/ATQ) and cash-to-
asset ratio (CHEQ/ATQ) as of the end of the quarter preceding the announcement quarter. ASR 
firms tend to be fairly large with a median (mean) market value of $6.23 ($13.46) billion.  
 The final sample consists of 178 observations 
with available discretionary accruals data in the ASR quarter.  
                                                 
10 Keywords used for Edgar search are as follows: accelerated share repurchase, accelerated stock repurchase, 
accelerated equity repurchase, accelerated share buyback, accelerated stock buyback, accelerated equity buyback, 
overnight share repurchase, overnight stock repurchase, overnight equity repurchase, overnight share buyback, 
overnight stock buyback, overnight equity buyback, accelerated buyback, accelerated repurchase, overnight 
buyback, overnight repurchase. Following Bargeron et al. (2011), I used the following search terms for Factiva: 
“(accelerated or overnight) and (share or equity or stock) and (repur* or buyback or buy-back or buy back)”.  
11 I do not extend my sample period beyond 2007 as firms cut repurchases aggressively during the financial crisis 
(Floyd, Li, and Skinner 2011). I identified 26 ASRs undertaken in 2008, comparable to 25 ASRs identified by 
Bargeron et al. (2011) during the same period. Including these observations (with the available accruals data) in the 
analysis does not materially alter my main conclusions.  
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 Panel C reports descriptive statistics regarding the transaction characteristics. The median 
(mean) transaction value is $250.00 ($608.48) million. The largest ASR transaction in the sample 
was undertaken by IBM, which repurchased $12.5 billion of its common stock on May 29, 2007. 
The median (mean) firm repurchases 3.71% (5.38%) of its outstanding equity. The percentage of 
ASR contracts with collar provisions, which establish the minimum and maximum post-
repurchase price adjustments, is 26%. The percentage of contracts including only cap and floor 
provisions is 12% and 3%, respectively.     
 
 
 
1.5    RESULTS 
 
 
1.5.1    Discretionary Accruals around the ASR announcement   
 
 
I examine the time-series of discretionary accruals around the ASR quarter as an initial test of the 
proposed hypotheses. Table 1.3 reports the median performance-adjusted discretionary accruals 
for quarters [-6, +6]. The median firm that undertakes an ASR reports statistically significant 
discretionary accruals of about 0.44% of total assets (p < 0.05) in the quarter of the ASR 
announcement (i.e., quarter 0), while there is no indication of significant earnings management 
during the four quarters prior to the announcement quarter. For instance, the median 
discretionary accruals in quarter -1 is 0.04% of total assets (p = 0.359). These results are 
consistent with the earnings management and signaling motivations.  
 Examination of immediate post-ASR quarters reveals that ASR firms also report positive 
discretionary accruals in quarter +2 (0.30%, p < 0.05) followed by negative discretionary 
accruals in quarter +3 (-0.21%, p < 0.10). Since discretionary accruals tend to reverse over time, 
the negative discretionary accruals reported in quarter +3 are more likely to be the outcome of 
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the reversal of the previously reported positive discretionary accruals than an intentional 
downward earnings management activity. Further, given that ASR contracts are generally settled 
in a period less than 6 months after the repurchase announcement (Bargeron et al. 2011), the use 
of income-decreasing accruals in the third quarter after the repurchase quarter is unlikely to have 
an impact on the cost of the repurchase.12
 
 Overall, the positive discretionary accruals observed 
around the ASR announcement lend support for the EMH and SUH.  
1.5.2    Regression of performance-adjusted accruals in the quarter of the ASR 
announcement 
 
Although the previous analysis documents that ASR firms alter discretionary accruals in the 
quarter of the announcement, it does not provide any insights into the cross-sectional 
determinants of their financial reporting behavior. Thus, in this section, I conduct a more 
rigorous test of the proposed hypotheses in a multivariate setting. In particular, if ASR firms are 
concerned with boosting their EPS, we should observe a positive relation between the percentage 
of equity repurchased and the discretionary accruals reported in the announcement quarter. A 
positive relation between the two variables would also be consistent with the SUH since it may 
also represent managers’ desire to reinforce the undervaluation signal conveyed through the 
repurchase program.  
 Further, according to the EMH, one would expect that firms initiating ASRs earlier rather 
than later in the quarter report higher discretionary accruals since undertaking an ASR earlier in 
the quarter results in a greater reduction in the weighted average number of shares. Another 
variable of interest is market-to-book ratio, which proxy for equity misvaluation as some argue 
                                                 
12 Previous studies (Gong et al., 2008a; Louis and White, 2007) document that the downward earnings management 
intended to depress the stock price takes place in the quarter of and the quarter prior to the repurchase.   
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(e.g., Baker et al. 2009). If managers use ASRs along with positive discretionary accruals to 
signal undervaluation, one would expect to see a negative relation between market-to-book ratio 
and discretionary accruals. 
 Finally, examining the link between executive compensation and discretionary accruals 
reported by ASR firms can also provide additional insight into the managerial intent. 
Particularly, if CEOs of the sample firms are concerned with boosting EPS quickly through 
ASRs to secure their bonus payments, one would expect to see a positive relation between the 
CEO’s bonus compensation as a fraction of total compensation and discretionary accruals.  
 To test the hypothesized relations, I estimate the following regression model (Equation 
3), which includes the main variables of interest (i.e., percentage of equity repurchased, within 
quarter timing of the ASR, market-to-book ratio, and CEO bonus compensation), as well as 
several control variables suggested in the previous literature (e.g., Ayers, Ramalingegowda, and 
Yeung, 2011; Gong et al., 2008a). Since, as pointed out by Gong et al. (2008a), the relation 
between earnings management and the percentage of outstanding equity repurchased may be 
endogenous, I report the results obtained from both the OLS and two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
regressions (the details regarding the instrumental variables are provided below).    
      PADJACC = α0 + α1EQREP+ α2EARLY + α3MB + α4BONUS+ α5COLLARS_CAPS   
      + α6EXERCISABLE + α7UNEXERCISABLE + α8OWNERSHIP  
      + α9MVALUE + α10ANALYST + α11LEV + α12LITIGATION   
     + Year fixed effects + ν                           (3) 
 where, PADJACC is the performance-adjusted discretionary accruals in the quarter of the ASR 
announcement; EQREP is the percentage of outstanding equity repurchased through the ASR 
transaction; EARLY is a dummy variable equal to 1 if an ASR is initiated earlier rather than later 
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in the quarter (i.e., the number of days between the ASR date and the end of the fiscal quarter is 
greater than the sample median of 42 days) and 0 otherwise; MB is the natural log of the market-
to-book ratio in the quarter preceding the announcement quarter; BONUS is the CEO’s 
performance-related bonus payments divided by his/her total compensation in the fiscal year 
prior to the announcement13
 The model includes a variable to control for whether the ASR contract has a collar or cap 
provision. On the one hand, the presence of such contractual provisions may be associated with 
greater monitoring by the investment bank and thereby, less use of discretionary accruals. On the 
; COLLARS_CAPS is a dummy variable equal to 1 if an ASR 
contract includes a provision specifying the maximum post-repurchase price adjustment and 0 
otherwise. EXERCISABLE and UNEXERCISABLE are, respectively, the ratio of exercisable and 
unexercisable options held by the CEO to the total number of shares outstanding prior to the 
announcement; OWNERSHIP is the number of shares held by the CEO divided by the total 
number of shares outstanding prior to the announcement; MVALUE is the natural log of the 
market value in the quarter preceding the announcement quarter; ANALYST is the number of 
analysts following the firm during the ASR quarter; LEV is the industry-median adjusted 
leverage in the quarter preceding the announcement quarter; LITIGATION is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if a firm’s SIC code is 2833-2836, 8731-8734, 7371-7379, 3570-3577, 3600-3674 and 
0 otherwise (Barton and Simko, 2002; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010). The high litigation risk 
industries include pharmaceuticals/biotechnology and computers/electronics.  
                                                 
13 To test this prediction, I hand-collect the data on CEO compensation from the firms’ last proxy statements filed 
prior to the announcement. One complication with the compensation data over the sample period is that the SEC 
changed the reporting requirements for executive compensation after December 2006. Under the new requirements, 
firms are currently reporting discretionary bonus (i.e., bonuses that are not related to performance measures and are 
under the discretion of the board) under the “Bonus” column, whereas performance-related bonus payments are 
reported under the title of “Non-equity Incentive Pay”. However, as also noted by Kim and Yang (2010), firms 
sometimes report the numbers in the wrong columns. Thus, I define the bonus compensation measure (BONUS) as 
the bonus payment plus non-equity incentive pay (available only in 2007) divided by total compensation. However, 
I read the footnotes accompanying the compensation tables to ensure that non-performance bonus payments (e.g., 
signing bonus for the new CEO, year-end holiday gift payments) are not included in the bonus measure. 
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other hand, the use of collared or capped contracts may be associated with greater use of 
discretionary accruals because these provisions limit the company’s risk stemming from post-
repurchase price increase. Further, given that the use of discretionary accruals to manage 
earnings is more pronounced at firms where the CEO’s potential total compensation is more 
closely tied to the value of option and stock holdings (Cheng and Warfield 2005; Bergstresser 
and Philippon 2006), the model controls for CEO’s equity incentives. The model also controls 
for the number of analyst following the firms because previous research finds that firms followed 
by more analysts manage their earnings less (e.g., Yu 2008). Additionally, I control for financial 
leverage because prior studies document that firms use income-increasing accruals to avoid 
violating debt covenants (e.g., DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994). Finally, since firms operating in 
high litigation risk industries use discretionary accruals less aggressively (e.g., Cohen and 
Zarowin 2010), the model includes an industry-based litigation dummy variable.  
 The results are presented in Table 1.4. The OLS regression results indicate that there is a 
statistically significant positive association between the discretionary accruals and the percentage 
of equity repurchased (coef. = 0.125, p < 0.05; column (4)). The documented relation is 
economically significant as well. One standard deviation (i.e., 4.32 percentage point) increase in 
the percentage of equity repurchased is associated with 0.54 percentage point increase in the 
reported discretionary accruals. However, if the relation between the two variables is 
endogenous, the OLS estimate is biased. To address this issue, I re-estimate Equation (3) using 
the 2SLS. I use two instruments for the percentage of equity repurchased: (1) “cash-to-asset ratio 
of the ASR firm” and (2) “the imputed interest rate on borrowing the shares of the ASR firm” (in 
the month prior to the announcement; calculated as in Diether and Werner (2008))14
                                                 
14 Following Bargeron et al. (2011), imputed interest rates are calculated each month separately for NYSE/Amex 
and Nasdaq firms using the stock exchange specific estimated regression coefficients reported in Diether and 
. First, the 
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rationale for the “cash-to-asset ratio” is that larger cash reserves enable ASR firms to acquire 
higher percentage of their equity without using external capital. Unreported correlation and 
regression analyses show that, while significantly positively related to the percentage of equity 
repurchased, cash-to-asset ratio is not significantly related to the performance-adjusted 
discretionary accruals. Second, the rationale for the “the imputed interest rate on borrowing the 
firm’s shares” is that the cost of undertaking an ASR increases with the borrowing rate since 
ASRs require an intermediary to borrow a significant number of repurchasing firm’s shares. 
Thus, higher imputed interest rate on borrowing the firm’s shares is expected to reduce the 
percentage of equity repurchased. As expected, unreported correlation and regression results 
show that there is a negative and significant relation between the two variables. As further 
diagnostic checks for 2SLS, I find that the over-identification restriction of both IVs holds (p-
value of the over-identification test is 0.691) and the F-statistic for the joint significance of the 
two IVs in the first stage is 9.92. These results suggest that the 2SLS estimation does not 
significantly suffer from the choice of weak IVs. 
 The 2SLS regression results reveal a significant relation between the percentage of equity 
repurchased and performance-adjusted abnormal accruals. The estimated coefficient on the 
percentage of equity is 0.460 and significant at 0.01 level. That is, it suggests that ASR firms’ 
tendency to increase the numerator of EPS via discretionary accruals is positively associated 
with the magnitude of repurchase-driven reduction in the denominator of EPS. This finding can 
also be interpreted as follows. Firms that aim at sending stronger signals of undervaluation 
                                                                                                                                                             
Werner (2008). For instance, for NYSE/Amex firms, I calculate the imputed rates as 1.913 - 0.008xlog(Market 
Value) - 0.021xlog(BM) - 0.308xReturnmonth t-1 - 0.174xReturnmonth [t-12, t-2] - 0.466xInstutional_Ownership - 
0.051xlog(Share Price) + 0.218xlog(Turnover) + 3.330xStdDev_Daily_Returnsmonth [t-12, t-1] - 0.097xlog(1+ Number 
of Analysts) + 29.731xRf.  
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through repurchasing higher percentage of their outstanding equity report higher discretionary 
accruals to reinforce this signal.  
 However, consistent with the EMH, the estimated coefficient on “Early” dummy is also 
positive (0.010) and significant at 0.05 level. Specifically, firms undertaking ASRs earlier in the 
quarter report discretionary accruals that are, on average, 1 percentage point higher than those 
undertaking ASRs later in the quarter. On the other hand, the estimated coefficient on market-to-
book ratio is close to zero and insignificant, casting doubt on the validity of the SUH, which 
predicts a negative relation between market-to-book ratio and magnitude of discretionary 
accruals. Finally, the OLS regression results show that there is a significantly positive relation 
between the CEO’s performance-related bonus compensation (as a fraction of total 
compensation) and discretionary accruals reported in the quarter of the announcement. The 
estimated coefficient on “Bonus” is 0.035 (p < .01), implying that one standard deviation (i.e., 
0.194 or 19.4%) increase in the CEO’s bonus compensation as a fraction of total compensation is 
associated with 0.68 percentage point increase in the discretionary accruals. This finding 
suggests that ASR firms at which the fraction of CEO’s wealth tied to bonus compensation is 
higher tend to engage in more aggressive earnings management, providing additional support for 
the EMH.   
 Regarding the control variables, the OLS regression results reveal that discretionary 
accruals reported in the ASR quarter increase with the industry-adjusted leverage and presence 
of a collar or cap provision in the ASR contract and decrease with the number of analysts 
following the firm. Although the other variables enter the regression equation with expected 
signs, they do not have statistically significant coefficients.  
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1.5.3    Stock performance before and around the ASR announcement 
 
In this section, I estimate the ASR firms’ stock performance before and around the repurchase 
announcement. I use the market model to calculate the abnormal stock return performance. The 
market model parameters are estimated over trading days -300 to -49 prior to the ASR 
announcement date (day 0) by using the CRSP value-weighted index as the market portfolio. I 
measure the pre-repurchase stock performance from day -150 to day -45 (approximately five 
months) and from day -44 to day -4 (approximately two months) relative to the repurchase 
announcement day. I measure the market reaction to ASR announcements over the three days 
centered on the announcement date.  
 The results are reported in Table 1.5. Over the window [-150, -45], the median firm 
undertaking an ASR experiences insignificant abnormal returns of -0.48% (p = 0.270). Similarly, 
there is no indication of significant abnormal stock performance over the window [-44, -4]. The 
median abnormal return during that period is -0.26% (p = 0.458). These results are inconsistent 
with the conjecture that ASR firms time their repurchases to coincide with temporary declines in 
their stock price (or when their equity is undervalued) and that managers of firms engaging in 
ASRs take actions to reduce their firms’ stock price prior to the repurchase.  
 I find that ASR announcements are associated with positive abnormal returns. The 
median (mean) three-day announcement return is 0.94% (1.37%), which is significant at 0.01 
level.15
                                                 
15 As compared to ASRs, the average announcement returns for the fixed-price tender offers (i.e., 14.03%) and 
Dutch-auction tender offers (i.e., 9.14%) are considerably higher (Louis, Sun, and White, 2010). 
 These figures are comparable to 0.95% (1.43%) reported in Bargeron et al. (2011). It is 
worth noting that Bargeron et al. (2011) find no evidence of stronger market reaction to ASR 
announcements as compared to OMR announcements. In their sample, the median (mean) three-
day announcement return for OMR programs not associated with any ASR is 1.21% (1.46%), 
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casting significant doubt on the relative signaling power of ASRs. It is also important to note 
that, in the case of ASRs (but not OMRs), the announcement and completion of the repurchase 
usually overlap. Thus, the reduction in the supply of shares induces upward price pressure from 
an increase in relative demand, elevating the ASR announcement returns.    
 
1.5.4    Regression of ASR announcement returns  
 
 
In this section, I analyze the association between pre-ASR discretionary accruals and the market 
reaction to the ASR announcement. I calculate performance-adjusted discretionary accruals (DA) 
for the quarterly earnings announcement that immediately precedes the repurchase 
announcement. Further, to directly examine the relation between income-increasing/decreasing 
discretionary accruals and announcement returns, I create two variables labeled positive 
discretionary accruals (PDA) and negative discretionary accruals (NDA), which are created as 
follows: 
 
PDA = �DA if DA > 0 0, otherwise       NDA = �DA if DA<0 0, otherwise   
 Under the signaling hypothesis, I expect the pre-repurchase positive discretionary 
accruals to be positively associated with the ASR announcement returns. In contrast, under the 
earnings management hypothesis, I expect a negative relation between positively discretionary 
accruals and ASR announcement returns, indicating that investors construe pre-ASR earnings 
inflation as opportunistic rather than optimistic. To test these predictions, I estimate the 
following model with OLS: 
          CAR3 = α0 + α1PDA+ α2NDA+ α3POSDUMMY+ α4STDEV + α5EQREP  
          + α6PRIORRET + α7MB + α8MVALUE + α9ILLIQUIDITY  
          + α10CASH + Year fixed effects + ζ         (4) 
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where, CAR3 is the three-day cumulative abnormal returns around the ASR announcement date; 
PDA (NDA) is the positive (negative) discretionary accruals reported for the earnings 
announcement that immediately precedes the ASR announcement; POSDUMMY is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if a firm reports positive discretionary accruals and 0 otherwise; STDEV is the 
pre-ASR standard deviation of returns calculated over the period of 300 trading days prior to the 
repurchase announcement and ending 49 trading days prior to the repurchase announcement; 
EQREP is the percentage of outstanding equity repurchased through the ASR transaction; 
PRIORRET is the cumulative abnormal returns over trading days -44 and -4 prior to the 
repurchase announcement; MB is the natural log of the market-to-book ratio in the quarter 
preceding the announcement quarter; MVALUE is the natural log of the market value in the 
quarter preceding the announcement quarter; ILLIQUIDITY is the log of Amihud (2002) measure 
of illiquidity, which is calculated as the absolute price change per dollar of trading volume over 
the period starting 300 trading days prior to the repurchase announcement and ending 49 trading 
days prior to the repurchase announcement; CASH is the cash-to-asset ratio in the quarter 
preceding the announcement quarter. The independent variables are winsorized at the 1% and 
99% levels and standard errors are clustered by firm.  
 Table 1.6 reports the regression results. I find significantly negative association between 
the ASR announcement returns and the positive discretionary accruals reported prior to the 
repurchase (coef. = -0.247, p < 0.05; column (3)). The estimated coefficient on PDA indicates 
that one standard deviation (i.e., 1.61 percentage points) increase in pre-repurchase positive 
discretionary accruals is associated with 0.40 percentage points decline in the three-day 
cumulative abnormal returns around the ASR announcement date. The negative relation between 
the positive discretionary accruals and ASR announcement returns suggests that investors 
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perceive positive discretionary accruals as the result of opportunistic behavior (i.e., boosting 
EPS) rather than managerial optimism (i.e., signaling undervaluation). This finding provides 
support for the EMH, whereas it is inconsistent with the SUH. 
  Furthermore, there is a marginally significant positive relation between the ASR 
announcement returns and the negative discretionary accruals reported prior to the repurchase 
(coef. = -0.406, p < 0.10; column (3)). That is, the market reaction to the ASR announcements is 
less positive as the repurchasing firms report higher income-decreasing accruals prior to the 
repurchase. This surprising result may be attributed to the notion that investors perceive negative 
discretionary accruals as the outcome of “expectations management” (for the upcoming bad 
quarter). Accordingly, investors revise downward (rather than upward) the stock prices of ASR 
firms reporting negative discretionary accruals prior to the repurchase.  
 
1.5.5    Post-ASR long-run stock performance  
 
 
As an additional test of distinguishing between the signaling and earnings management 
motivations, I examine the post-repurchase long-run stock performance of ASR firms, as well as 
the association, if any, between the discretionary accruals reported by ASR firms and post-
repurchase long-run stock performance. Louis and White (2007) document that fixed-price 
repurchasers experience positive abnormal stock performance during the post-repurchase period 
and that superior long-run performance is strongest for the firms that report the largest 
discretionary accruals. They conclude that consistent with the signaling motivation, high 
discretionary accruals reported by fixed-price repurchases are indicators of superior long-term 
performance. Thus, under the SUH, I expect that ASR firms, on average, experience positive 
abnormal stock performance during the post-repurchase period and that superior performance is 
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more pronounced for the firms reporting the highest discretionary accruals. In contrast, under the 
EMH, I expect that ASR firms, on average, do not exhibit any positive long-run stock 
performance and that long-run stock performance does not increase with reported discretionary 
accruals.   
 To calculate long-run abnormal stock returns, I estimate the Carhart (1997) four-factor 
calendar-time regressions over the 12- and 24-month period following the ASR announcement. 
The calendar-time portfolio approach introduced by Jaffe (1974) and Mandelker (1974) is 
commonly used in the literature (e.g., Mitchell and Stafford, 2000; Louis and White, 2007; Gong 
et al., 2008a) since it corrects for the potential bias in statistical inferences stemming from the 
cross-sectional dependence of event-firm abnormal returns that are overlapping in calendar time. 
The results are presented in Table 1.7.  
 The dependent variable in the calendar-time regressions is the ASR firm monthly 
portfolio returns in excess of risk-free rate. In Panel A (B), ASR firm returns are included in 
portfolio returns for the period from one to twelve (twenty four) months after the month of the 
ASR announcement. These portfolios are rebalanced each month to drop all firms that reach the 
end of their respective post-ASR periods and add all firms that have announced an ASR. To 
obtain reliable estimates, I exclude the calendar months where there are less than five 
observations. Furthermore, since the number of observations changes across calendar months, I 
use weighted-least square regression, where the weighting vector is the number of event firms 
having non-missing returns in a relevant calendar month (e.g., Lyandres, Sun, and Zhang, 2008). 
Further, I calculate p-values based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.  
 The results for the full sample do not suggest any abnormal stock performance during the 
post-ASR period. Equally- and value-weighted regression alphas are negative and statistically 
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insignificant in both 12- and 24-month period (αEW-12 = -0.01%, p = 0.980; αVW-12 = -0.13%, p = 
0.556; αEW-24 = -0.06%, p = 0.754; αVW-24 = -0.32%, p = 0.113). These results fail to support the 
signaling motivation. I also estimate the calendar-time regressions separately for the high and 
low discretionary accrual firms. Firms with ASR quarter discretionary accruals (DA) above the 
sample median are classified in the high DA group; otherwise they are included in the low DA 
group. The results reveal that the high DA group does not experience higher abnormal returns 
than the low DA group in either period. In fact, equally- and value-weighted alphas for the high 
DA group are consistently lower than those of the low DA group, albeit the differences in alphas 
between the two groups are not statistically significant. These results are again inconsistent with 
the SUH, while they lend support for the EMH.    
  
 
 
1.6    EXTENSIONS AND ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS 
 
 
1.6.1    Earnings per share (EPS) performance around the ASR announcement  
 
 
In this section, I analyze the quarterly EPS performance before and after the ASR quarter 
(quarters -4 through +4) to see whether ASR firms actually needed a boost in their EPS 
performance. I also examine the time-series pattern of consensus analyst estimate around the 
ASR announcement date to understand how analysts respond to the ASR announcements. The 
results are reported in Table 1.8.  
 Panel A presents the quarterly EPS surprise (cents per share), which is defined as the 
difference between the firm’s actual EPS for a given quarter and the median consensus analyst 
estimate four months prior to the quarterly earnings announcement date. Both actual EPS and 
estimated EPS data are obtained from the First Call database. Following previous research (e.g., 
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Louis, 2004), I do not use the latest consensus forecast prior to the earnings announcement since 
executives try to manage analysts’ expectations during the months prior to the earnings 
announcements and lead them to revise their estimates downward enough to yield nonnegative 
surprise upon announcement (Chan, Karceski, and Lakonishok, 2007).  
 The results suggest that ASR firms consistently beat/meet the consensus analyst estimate 
in quarters -4 through -2. For instance, in quarter -2, the mean (median) EPS surprise is 2.08 
(1.00) cents and significant at 0.05 level. However, in quarters -1 through +2, ASR firms never 
beat the consensus forecast. In particular, the mean (median) EPS surprise is -0.51 (0.00) cents in 
the quarter of the ASR announcement. This finding is consistent with the argument that the 
sample firms’ desire to enhance their EPS performance in the announcement quarter (and 
possibly the upcoming quarter) is associated with their decision to undertake an ASR. Finally, in 
quarters +3 and +4, the actual quarterly EPS reported by ASR firms fall short of the analysts’ 
forecasts.  
 Panels B and C present the time-series of the median consensus analyst estimate for the 
ASR quarter earnings over the period 120 days prior to the ASR announcement date and 30 days 
after the ASR announcement date. Specifically, Panel B reports the consensus estimate for those 
analysts who constantly follow the ASR firms beginning at least 120 days before the ASR.16
                                                 
16 For instance, an analyst who provided his/her first estimate (for the ASR quarter) 110 days before the ASR date is 
not included in this group. Similarly, if an analyst stops providing an estimate anytime before the earnings 
announcement for the ASR quarter is excluded (even though s/he provides an estimate at least 120 days before the 
ASR date).   
 
Panel C, however, does not impose any restrictions on the analyst following period. As shown in 
Panel B, the median consensus estimate 120 days before the ASR date is 57.00 cents. 
Nonetheless, consistent with the suggestion that managers guide analysts’ expectations to 
“beatable” levels, a considerable decline is evident in the analysts’ earnings forecasts by the time 
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of the ASR. The last consensus estimate on the day before the ASR is 54.00 cents, which is also 
the last consensus estimate 1 day, 10 days, and 30 days after the ASR (as well as before the 
earnings announcement). These results suggest that analysts constantly following the ASR firms 
do not adjust their estimates following the ASR announcement. Although the results for the non-
restricted analyst sample reveal an upward revision in the consensus estimate after the 
announcement of the ASRs, this revision is only temporary. In particular, the last consensus 
estimate 1 day before (10 days after) the ASR is 53.00 (54.00) cents. However, the consensus 
estimate drops back to 53.00 cents by the end of the month following the ASR announcement 
and stays at the same level before the announcement of the quarterly earnings. Overall, the 
results suggest that managers of firms undertaking ASRs engage in “expectations management” 
and guide analysts’ forecasts downward during the pre-ASR period, making it easier for them to 
meet the EPS targets. In addition, the positive impact of ASRs on reported EPS does not seem to 
be fully reflected in analysts’ last consensus estimate prior to the earnings announcement for the 
ASR quarter. These results are consistent with the conjecture that managers use ASRs along with 
positive discretionary accruals to boost EPS performance.  
 
 1.6.2    Operating performance around the ASR announcement  
 
  
Finally, I analyze how operating performance of ASR firms changes in the post-repurchase 
period. If managers undertake ASRs to signal their optimism about firms’ prospects, the sample 
firms are expected to experience a significant improvement in their operating performance 
following the repurchase. On the other hand, if managers initiate ASRs to boost quarterly EPS 
performance, ASR announcements are not expected to be followed by an increase in operating 
performance.   
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 Following Lie (2005), operating performance is defined as the operating income divided 
by the average cash-adjusted total assets (i.e., total assets minus cash and cash equivalents) at the 
beginning and end of the fiscal quarter. I examine unadjusted, industry-adjusted (two-digit SIC 
level), and performance-adjusted operating performance. Industry-adjusted performance is 
calculated by subtracting the industry-median performance from the ASR firm’s operating 
performance.  
 The performance-adjusted measure is the firm’s operating performance minus the 
operating performance of its respective industry-, performance-, and M/B-matched control firm. 
I select the control firms using the matching procedure suggested by Lie (2005). Specifically, for 
each sample firm, I first identify all firms that operate in the same two-digit industry as the 
sample firm and that have (1) operating performance within 20% or within 0.01 of the 
performance of the sample firm in the announcement quarter (i.e., quarter 0), (2) operating 
performance for the four quarters ending with the quarter 0 within 20% or within 0.01 of that of 
the sample firm, and (3) pre-announcement market-to-book value of assets within 20% or within 
0.1 of that of the sample firm.17
     | PerformanceQuarter 0, Sample Firm - PerformanceQuarter 0, Firm i |  
 If I cannot identify a potential control firm that meets the above 
criteria, I search among one-digit SIC codes. If still no firm meets the criteria, I relax the SIC 
code, performance, and market-to-book criteria. From all the potential matches, I choose the firm 
with the lowest sum of absolute performance difference, defined as 
     + | PerformanceQuarters -3 through 0, Sample Firm - Performance Quarters -3 through 0, Firm i |           (4) 
 Table 1.9 presents both the levels of and changes in unadjusted and adjusted operating 
performance measures. The median unadjusted performance is 3.48% in the quarter of the ASR 
                                                 
17 Market-to-book value of assets is the market value of equity plus the book value of debt scaled by the book value 
of assets (PRCCQ x CSHOQ +ATQ – CHEQ) / ATQ).   
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announcement. The changes in the unadjusted performance from quarter 0 to future quarters (i.e., 
quarters +1 through +4) suggest no improvement in the operating performance of ASR firms. 
Similarly, the industry-adjusted performance shows that although ASR firms do better than the 
median firm in their industries, their performance with respect to their peers does not improve 
following the ASR announcement. Finally, examination of the performance-adjusted measure 
reveals that ASR firms do not exhibit a significant change in their operating performance during 
the post-repurchase period as compared to the ASR announcement quarter. Overall, the results 
presented in Table 1.9 indicate that operating performance of ASR firms do not improve during 
the year following the repurchase, which is inconsistent with the signaling hypothesis but 
provides some support for the earnings management hypothesis.    
 
1.6.3    Robustness tests 
 
 
Bargeron et al. (2011) point out that firms are more likely to include ASRs in their repurchase 
programs when they have recently completed asset sales and been takeover targets. One might 
argue that firms undertaking ASRs following asset sales use the ASR more as a means of 
returning cash to investors quickly than managing EPS or signaling undervaluation. Thus, 
including such firms in the sample may bias reported results. Accordingly, I exclude firms with 
the absolute value of discontinued operations (Compustat item DOQ) scaled by total assets 
greater than 0.005 in the quarter of or the quarter prior the ASR. This restriction eliminates 
thirteen observations from the final sample but it does not qualitatively change the results. 
Further, given that managers may use repurchases to deter takeovers (e.g., Billet and Xue, 2007), 
I identify and exclude seven firms that have been listed as takeover targets on the SDC’s Mergers 
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and Acquisitions database anytime between twelve months before and after the ASR date. 
Dropping these firms from the sample again does not materially alter the findings.  
 Specifically, the median discretionary accruals for the restricted sample, which does not 
include firms with assets sales and firms listed as takeover targets, is 0.39% of total assets (p < 
0.10). The upward earnings management in the ASR quarter again increases with the percentage 
of equity repurchased (coef. = 0.119, p < 0.10), initiation of the ASR earlier in the quarter (coef. 
= 0.010, p < .05), and CEO’s bonus compensation (coef. = 0.030, p < 0.05). Additionally, the 
negative relation between the ASR announcement returns and positive discretionary accruals 
continues to hold (-0.282, p < 0.05). There is also no evidence of positive abnormal stock return 
or operating performance during the post-ASR period.    
 
 
 
1.7    CONCLUSION 
 
 
Accelerated share repurchases (ASRs) represent an important innovation in repurchase methods, 
yet little is known about the managerial motives behind ASRs. One way to gain insight into 
managerial motives for share repurchases is to examine managers’ financial reporting behavior 
around repurchases. The analysis of discretionary accruals reported by ASR firms reveals that 
they inflate reported earnings around the repurchase announcement. However, there is a negative 
relation between the ASR announcement returns and the positive discretionary accruals reported 
prior to the ASR, suggesting that investors consider ASR firms’ discretionary reporting behavior 
opportunistic rather than optimistic. This result is consistent with the conjecture that managers 
initiating ASRs are more likely to be concerned with enhancing EPS performance than signaling 
their favorable private information about firms’ prospects.   
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 Furthermore, I document that there is a positive relation between the percentage of 
outstanding equity repurchased through the ASR transaction and discretionary accruals reported 
in the quarter of the announcement. That is, ASR firms’ tendency to increase the numerator of 
EPS through discretionary accruals is positively associated with the magnitude of repurchase-
driven reduction in the denominator of EPS. Moreover, the upward earnings management in the 
announcement quarter is more pronounced among firms which initiate the repurchase earlier 
rather than later in the quarter and where bonus payments account for a greater portion of the 
CEO’s annual pay.  
 The results also reveal that while ASR firms consistently beat the consensus analyst 
estimate (four months prior to the earnings announcement) during the pre-repurchase quarters, 
they either miss or just meet the consensus forecast during the post-repurchase period. In 
addition, I document that although ASR firms usually perform better than their industry peers, 
they do not experience a significant improvement in their operating performance during the post-
repurchase period. Consistent with the lack of improvement in the post-ASR operating 
performance, I find no evidence of long-run positive abnormal stock performance of ASR firms. 
Overall, the results suggest that managers use ASRs along with positive discretionary accruals to 
sustain recent performance.   
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2.0    CHAPTER 2: HOW DO FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS RELATE TO FINANCIAL 
REPORTING QUALITY? EVIDENCE FROM SEASONED EQUITY OFFERINGS 
 
 
 
 
2.1    INTRODUCTION 
 
 
A significant body of research has examined the relation between financial constraints and firms’ 
real decisions, particularly investment policy (e.g., Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen 1988; Kaplan 
and Zingales 1997; Denis and Sibilkov 2010) and R&D expenditures (e.g., Campello, Graham, 
and Campbell 2010). However, the link between financial constraints and firms’ non-operational 
decisions, namely corporate financial reporting, has not been previously explored. This study 
attempts to fill this gap.  
 Previous studies examining managers’ financial reporting behavior hypothesize that the 
trade-off between the costs and benefits of manipulating earnings changes during periods when a 
firm raises capital (for a review, see Dechow, Ge, and Schrand 2010). In particular, higher utility 
associated with the availability or pricing of external capital may increase the benefits of 
opportunistic reporting. This effect may be more pronounced for financially constrained firms, 
which incur higher transaction and agency costs when they attempt to raise external capital. 
Accordingly, I compare the earnings management strategies of financially constrained and 
unconstrained firms around seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) to test the connection between 
financial constraints and financial reporting.18
                                                 
18 SEO firms are not shut out of the financial markets because they have access to equity markets. Following 
Korajczyk and Levy (2003), I use the terms “constrained” and “unconstrained” to denote a relative relation. 
However, it is worth noting that most issuers operate under tight financial conditions prior to the SEO (DeAngelo, 
 Specifically, I propose and test a rational 
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expectations hypothesis which posits that constrained firms report higher income-increasing 
accruals around SEOs than unconstrained firms and that the aggressive earnings management by 
constrained firms is a rational response to anticipated market behavior at offering announcements 
(i.e., higher discounting of their stock price by investors) rather than simply being the result of 
managerial opportunism.  
 A number of studies have documented that SEO firms, on average, report higher earnings 
by altering discretionary accruals around the offering (e.g., Rangan 1998; Teoh, Welch, and 
Wong 1998a; Shivakumar 2000; Cohen and Zarowin 2010). However, as Dechow et al. (2010, p. 
384) point out: “while the studies provide fairly consistent evidence of accruals management 
when firms raise capital, they do not expand the analysis to examine cross-sectional variation in 
accruals management.” Notably, why do some issuers manage their earnings aggressively, 
rendering themselves vulnerable to litigation (DuCharme, Malatesta, and Sefcik 2004), whereas 
others choose to manage their earnings more conservatively?  
 I propose that issuers’ financial constraints― frictions preventing firms from funding all 
desired investments19
                                                                                                                                                             
DeAngelo, and Stulz 2010). In fact, DeAngelo et al. (2010, p. 276) point out: “most issuers would have run out of 
cash by the year after the SEO had they not received the offer proceeds.”  
―  play an important role in shaping their financial reporting behavior 
around SEOs. Previous research theoretically defines financially constrained firms as those that 
do not have enough cash to undertake investment opportunities and that face severe agency and 
transaction costs when accessing capital markets (e.g., Korajczyk and Levy 2003). Constrained 
(C) firms are therefore expected to have greater incentive than unconstrained (UC) firms to use 
earnings management in an attempt to boost their stock price and raise external capital at a 
favorable price. Hence, SEOs provide an interesting setting in which to examine the interplay 
19 Lamont, Polk, and Saa-Requejo  (2001, p. 529)  note: “This inability to fund investments might be due to credit 
constraints, or inability to borrow, inability to issue equity, dependence on bank loans, or illiquidity of assets”. 
Consistent with previous research, I do not use “financial constraints” to mean financial distress.  
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between firms’ financing constraints and financial reporting behavior. The central thesis of this 
paper is that C firms use income-increasing accruals more aggressively than UC firms around 
equity offerings. The logic underlying this argument is based on Stein’s (1989) rational 
expectations model. Investors are rational and anticipate that issuers facing a high level of 
financial constraints have a greater tendency to manage earnings upward. So, they correctly 
conjecture that there will be higher earnings inflation by C issuers and adjust their valuation 
accordingly at offering announcements. Thus, C issuers rationally report higher income-
increasing accruals than UC issuers. In general, the earnings management game between issuers 
and the stock market participants is analogous to the prisoner’s dilemma. The cooperative 
equilibrium would involve no earnings inflation on the part of managers and no discounting of 
inflated earnings by the stock market. However, this is not sustainable as a Nash equilibrium. If 
the stock market participants do not conjecture earnings inflation, managers will have an 
incentive to fool them by boosting earnings. More important, the higher the issuer’s financial 
constraints, the worse the problem becomes.         
  Consistent with my prediction, by using different measures of financial constraints (i.e., 
firm size, payout ratio, the Whited and Wu (2006) index, and the Size-Age index of Hadlock and 
Pierce (2010)), I find that the difference in median performance-adjusted discretionary current 
accruals (as a percentage of total assets) between the constrained and unconstrained groups is 
significantly positive in the SEO year (e.g., 4.51 percent versus 0.53 percent under the size 
classification). This result is robust to controlling for several variables that may affect the level 
of discretionary current accruals such as growth opportunities, operational volatility, analyst 
following, auditor type, and CEO equity holdings, as well as using the instrumental variable 
approach. Furthermore, I document that C firms, but not UC firms, consistently manage their 
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earnings upward during the three-year period prior to the offering. However, the difference in 
discretionary current accruals between the two groups dissipates after the first year following the 
offering.  
 It is worth noting that as opposed to the short-term benefits of earnings management, 
there are certain costs associated with managing earnings aggressively such as higher likelihood 
of being subject to investigations of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and 
deterioration in future operating performance (e.g., DuCharme et al. 2004; Desai, Hogan, and 
Wilkins 2006; Karpoff, Lee, and Martin 2008). One might argue that such reputational concerns 
may prevent issuers from using discretionary accruals aggressively. I find, however, that C 
issuers report higher income-increasing accruals than UC issuers after controlling for litigation 
risk, issuance of a subsequent SEO, and CEO age. This result is in line with previous research on 
earnings misstatement suggesting that the benefit of earnings misstatement seems to exceed the 
expected cost of misstatement for the firms seeking to secure external financing, leading these 
firms to manipulate their earnings but in turn, face enforcement actions by the SEC (e.g., 
Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney 1996; Dechow et al. 2011).  
 Further, the results reveal that investors take pre-SEO earnings inflation into account 
when pricing issuers’ stocks at offering announcements. Specifically, as predicted, I find that 
SEO announcement returns for firms engaging in aggressive earnings management are 
significantly more negative than those undertaking conservative earnings management (i.e., the 
difference in average five-day CAR between the two groups is 1.12 percentage points). Also, 
consistent with the argument that C issuers cannot credibly signal the absence of aggressive 
earnings management, I document that reporting lower discretionary accruals is associated with 
higher announcement returns for UC issuers but not C issuers.  
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  The present research extends our current understanding of earnings management around 
corporate events in two important ways. First, as pointed out by Dechow et al. (2010), previous 
research has paid scant attention to the determinants of cross-sectional variation in discretionary 
accruals reported by firms issuing SEOs. I document that issuers’ pre-offering financial 
constraints are an important factor in explaining the level of discretionary current accruals 
reported in the year of the SEO. Second, this study contributes to the nascent empirical literature 
that proposes rational explanations for the observed changes in managers’ reporting behavior 
around corporate events (Erickson and Wang 1999; Shivakumar 2000). Given that the extant 
empirical literature on earnings management is dominated by studies suggesting that the use of 
discretionary accruals around corporate events is the result of opportunistic behavior of 
managers20
 Furthermore, this paper contributes to the literature by demonstrating an alternative 
avenue, i.e., earnings quality, through which financial constraints may be linked to firm value 
and thus, complements and extends previous research documenting the valuation impact of 
financial constraints by examining firms’ real decisions (e.g., Denis and Sibilkov 2010). A 
, who are assumed to use their financial reporting discretion to mislead market 
participants, this research can be seen as a part of a challenging task aimed at reconciling the 
evidences of earnings management with the theory of efficient capital markets. In particular, I 
document evidence consistent with Stein’s (1989) argument that capital market pressure results 
in managerial myopia and lower earnings quality, even when the stock market participants are 
rational.      
                                                 
20 There is also a stream of literature suggesting that managers report positive discretionary accruals to signal their 
private information to the market participants (e.g., Subramanyam 1996; Louis and Robinson 2005; Louis and White 
2007). For instance, Louis and Robinson (2005) argue that managers report income-increasing accruals prior to 
stock splits to communicate their favorable beliefs to the market. They document a positive relation between the 
income-increasing accruals and stock split announcement returns, implying that investors do perceive positive 
discretionary accruals reported prior to stock splits as the result of managerial optimism (rather than managerial 
opportunism).  
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contemporaneous working paper by Linck, Netter, and Shu (2011) also investigates whether 
earnings management is related to financial constraints. They find that financially constrained 
firms inflate their earnings more as compared to unconstrained firms during the quarters prior to 
investment and attribute this finding to managerial optimism such that constrained firms use 
positive discretionary accruals to signal their prospects and enhance their financing capacity. My 
results do not support this signaling hypothesis as I find that SEO announcement returns are 
lower for issuers reporting higher discretionary accruals. Also, I find that the positive relation 
between financial constraints and earnings management is robust to controlling for growth 
opportunities (i.e., market-to-book ratio). The discrepancy between the two papers regarding the 
proposed motivation for constrained firms’ greater use of income-increasing accruals might arise 
because of differences in the study contexts. Specifically, while Linck et al. focus on earnings 
management activity of all public firms prior to investment quarters, I examine the discretionary 
accruals reported only by those firms issuing SEOs.    
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the related literature and 
presents my hypotheses. Section III discusses the measures of earnings management and 
financial constraints. Section IV describes the sample selection and database. Section V presents 
the empirical models used to test the hypotheses and the results of the tests. Section VI provides 
the summary and conclusions.  
 
 
 
2.2    RELATED LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES 
 
 
Previous research suggests that incentives to influence equity market valuation affect firms’ 
financial reporting behavior. In particular, several studies have documented that firms report 
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income-increasing accruals around initial public offerings (IPOs) (e.g., Friedlan 1994; Teoh, 
Welch, and Wong 1998b; Morsfield and Tan 2006; Fan 2007), seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) 
(e.g., Rangan 1998; Teoh et al. 1998a; Shivakumar 2000; Cohen and Zarowin 2010), and stock-
for-stock acquisitions (e.g., Erickson and Wang 1999; Louis 2004).  
 Teoh et al. (1998b) maintain that upward earnings management enables IPO firms to 
raise higher capital as buyers, who are guided by earnings but are unaware of earnings inflation, 
pay higher prices for the equity offered than the level justified by unmanaged earnings. The 
authors write (p. 1941): “Our hypothesis is that the marginal investor does not rationally discount 
for earnings management in forming expectations about future cash flows.” In parallel, Rangan 
(1998) and Teoh et al. (1998a) argue that firms issuing SEOs use income-increasing accruals to 
temporarily manipulate their stock prices and that investors overvalue issuers at the time of the 
offering and are subsequently disappointed by declines in the post-SEO earnings performance 
stemming from the reversal of discretionary accruals. In other words, the motivation of managers 
reporting positive discretionary accruals prior to SEOs is to mislead investors who naïvely 
extrapolate increases in pre-SEO earnings. In contrast, Shivakumar (2000) asserts that pre-SEO 
earnings management cannot be designed to mislead investors. Alternatively, he proposes the 
“managerial response hypothesis” which suggests that investors anticipate earnings management 
before the offering and discount issuers’ stock prices at the announcement and that earnings 
management is the rational response of issuers to anticipated market behavior at offering 
announcements. Although Shivakumar’s framework explains the presence of earnings 
management around SEOs, it is silent about what determines the magnitude of earnings 
management undertaken by issuers.  
 Erickson and Wang (1999) propose a similar explanation for the reporting behavior of 
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managers of acquiring firms around stock-for-stock mergers. They argue that the target firm 
would rationally anticipate that the acquirer would try to boost its pre-merger stock price by 
reporting income-increasing accruals. Accordingly, the target discounts the value of the 
acquirer’s stock. Thus, if the acquirer did not manage its earnings upward as expected by the 
target, it would end up offering higher number of shares for the target, increasing the cost of 
acquisition. As a result, it is only rational for the acquirers to overstate earnings prior to stock-
for-stock acquisitions. Modeling earnings management prior to equity offerings as the outcome 
of rational expectations model is consistent with Stein’s (1989) and Narayanan’s (1985) models 
of myopic corporate behavior. In these models, managers attempt to boost short-term 
performance (by making decisions that provide immediate cash flows but hurt long-term 
performance) even though they do not gain anything in the equilibrium as rational investors 
anticipate their actions and discount reported performance. Despite the fact that managers do not 
gain from their myopic behaviors, they cannot afford to deviate from non-cooperative 
equilibrium, since it would only make them worse off. As Stein (1989, p.668) succinctly puts it, 
“The Nash approach clearly exposes the fallacy inherent in a statement such as ‘since managers 
can’t systematically fool the market, they won’t bother trying’.” Anecdotal evidence provides 
support for the Stein’s theory. A Forbes article by David Raymond (2000) using a pseudonym 
for the executive referred in the article reveals: “A lot of these [high-tech] companies are playing 
the game […] The game Monty is talking about is that of earnings management and dubious 
dealings among companies. No doubt, Monty plays the game to some extent. He’d be a fool not 
to.”      
 Stein further argues that the extent to which managers attempt to manipulate earnings 
depends on the level of “capital market pressure” they face to participate in the earnings 
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management game and that this pressure can stem from different sources including funding 
requirements. He points out that while financially sound firms can insulate themselves from 
constant scrutiny by the capital market participants, those facing tighter financial conditions are 
subject to higher effective capital market pressure. Thus, I propose that the amount of earnings 
management in equity issuing firms increases with their financial constraints. Specifically, there 
are three main reasons why constrained issuers are expected to report greater income-increasing 
accruals during SEOs. First, the need to raise external financing at favorable prices is an 
important reason why managers window-dress the financial reports (e.g., Dechow et al. 1996; 
Firth, Rui, and Wu 2011). Given that the value of an additional dollar raised through the offering 
is higher for constrained firms than unconstrained firms (Faulkender and Wang 2006), the utility 
associated with aggressive earnings management is greater for constrained issuers. Second, 
higher offering price ensures that the issuing firm raises a targeted amount of capital by selling 
fewer shares, preventing the issuer from diluting higher level of ownership to outside investors 
(Kim and Park 2005).  As the amount of capital raised through the SEO increases, the marginal 
benefit of managing earnings upward (i.e., additional decrease in dilution of ownership due to 
increased stock price) increases. Since, everything else equal, constrained issuers tend to raise a 
larger amount of capital than unconstrained issuers, the marginal benefit of earnings 
management is higher for constrained issuers. Third, constrained firms are subject to higher 
information asymmetry (Almeida and Campello 2010), decreasing the credibility of their 
financial statements. This discussion leads to the following hypotheses: 
H1: Financially constrained firms manage their earnings upward more aggressively around SEOs 
than financially unconstrained firms.  
H2: Aggressive earnings management around SEOs is associated with lower SEO announcement 
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returns.  
 
2.2.1    Alternative hypothesis  
 
 
In the Myers-Majluf (1984) model, managers, who are better informed than investors about the 
value of the firm’s assets-in-place (as well as its growth opportunities), prefer to issue equity 
when their private valuation is lower than that of the market participants. However, investors, 
who rationally infer this managerial preference, reduce the value of offering firms at the 
announcement. Accordingly, the Myers-Majluf model predicts that firms with ample financial 
slack and debt capacity choose to finance their projects first with internal funds, then with debt, 
and finally with equity. Investors therefore would perceive equity offered by unconstrained 
versus constrained firms as more overvalued and adjust their valuation accordingly at the time of 
the offering. So, the alternative hypothesis posits that unconstrained rather than constrained firms 
report higher income-increasing accruals prior to the offering as a response to anticipated 
investor behavior (i.e., higher discounting of the stock price) at offering announcements.  
 
 
 
2.3    VARIABLE MEASUREMENT 
 
 
2.3.1    Financial constraints criteria  
 
 
A number of alternative measures of financial constraints have been proposed in the literature. 
However, there is no agreement on which measure is the best proxy for financial constraints. 
Previous studies therefore use several alternative measures instead of a single measure to avoid 
potential problems stemming from the misclassification of firms. Accordingly, I use four 
alternative approaches to sort firms into the financially constrained and unconstrained groups:  
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1. Firm size: Following previous research (e.g., Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach 2004; Denis 
and Sibilkov 2010), I rank the sample firms based on their inflation-adjusted book value of 
assets at the end of the year preceding the offering year and assign those firms in the bottom 
(top) tercile of the distribution to the financially constrained (unconstrained) group.21
2. Payout Ratio: Following prior studies suggesting that unconstrained firms are more likely to 
have higher payout ratios (e.g., Fazzari et al. 1988; Almeida and Campello 2010; Louis, Sun, 
and Urcan 2012), I rank the sample firms based on their payout ratio at the end of the year 
preceding the offering year and assign those firms in the bottom (top) tercile of the 
distribution to the financially constrained (unconstrained) group. Payout ratio is defined as 
the ratio of dividends (Compustat item DVC plus Compustat item DVP) and share 
repurchases (Compustat item PRSTKC) to operating income (Compustat item OIBDP). 
Payout ratio is set equal to 1 if a firm has negative operating income and positive payout 
(e.g., Hadlock and Pierce 2010).   
 The 
reasoning that lies behind this approach is that small firms are younger and less well-known 
and thus, more vulnerable to capital market imperfections stemming from information 
asymmetries and collateral constraints. Archer and Faerber (1966) is one of the earliest 
studies documenting the negative relation between firm size and the cost of raising equity 
capital. More recently, Hennessy and Whited (2007) estimate that financing costs are almost 
twice as large for small firms as for large firms.  
3. The Whited and Wu (WW) index:  Employing a structural investment model, Whited and Wu 
(2006) develop a structural index of firms’ external finance constraints by using all 
                                                 
21 I do not discard those observations in the middle tercile (according to a financial constraints criterion) and keep 
such “opaque” issuers in the sample to be used in the regression analysis. Thus, I create a dummy variable (labeled 
“Medium-FC”) that is equal to 1 if an issuer is in the middle tercile and 0 otherwise. Although I expect that these 
firms also manage their earnings more aggressively as compared to financially unconstrained firms, the significance 
of the difference in discretionary current accruals between the two groups is ultimately an empirical question.     
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Compustat firms for the period of 1975-2001. The index is a combination of six factors: cash 
flow, dividend dummy, leverage, firm size, industry sales growth, and firm sales growth. The 
index increases with the firm’s financial constraints and is calculated as follows:  
  WWit = -0.091*CFit - 0.062*DIVPOSit + 0.021*TLTDit - 0.044*LNTAit  
              + 0.102*ISGit - 0.035*SGit           (1) 
where, CF is cash flow (Compustat item IB plus Compustat item DP) divided by lagged total 
assets; DIVPOS is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm pays dividends and 0 otherwise; TLTD 
is long-term debt (Compustat item DLTT) divided by total assets; LNTA is the natural log of 
inflation-adjusted total assets; ISG is the firm’s three-digit SIC industry annual sales growth; SG 
is the firm’s annual sales growth. I rank the sample firms based on their WW index at the end of 
the year preceding the offering year and assign those firms in the top (bottom) tercile of the 
distribution to the financially constrained (unconstrained) group. This approach is similar to 
those employed in Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2009) and Duchin (2010).  
4. The Size-Age (SA) Index: Recently, Hadlock and Pierce (2010) develop a financial 
constraints index using two factors: firm size and age. They obtain the index loadings via 
order logit regression where the dependent variable ranges from 1 (least constrained) to 5 
(most constrained) and is coded based on a firm’s level of constraints identified through 
manual inspection of the firm’s annual reports and 10-K filings.  The index is calculated as 
follows: 
      SAit = -0.737*SIZEit + 0.043*(SIZEit)2 - 0.040*AGEit                                       (2) 
where, SIZE is the natural log of inflation-adjusted total assets and AGE is the number of years 
the firm is listed with a non-missing stock price on Compustat. As suggested by the authors, in 
calculating the index, SIZE is winsorized at the natural log of $4.5 billion and AGE is winsorized 
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at thirty seven years. Since the SA index is higher for financially constrained firms, I assign 
those firms in the top (bottom) tercile of the distribution of the index value at the end of the year 
preceding the offering year to the financially constrained (unconstrained) group.  
 It is important to note that sorting sample firms on each measure into three groups and 
using the resulting ranks in the analysis reduce noise and facilitate comparability across 
measures. As expected, there is a significant positive correlation among the four different 
measures of financial constraints with the correlation coefficients ranging from 0.28 to 0.77 (p’s 
< 0.01).  
 
2.3.2     Earnings management 
 
 
Following Teoh et al. (1998a, 1998b) and Louis (2004), I employ discretionary current accruals 
as a measure of earnings management and use the cross-sectional adoption of the modified-Jones 
model (Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney 1995) to obtain the discretionary current accruals for a 
given year. Specifically, for each industry (two-digit SIC code) and each year, I estimated 
equation (3) using all firms that have necessary accounting data on Compustat and with assets 
greater than $1M.    
 CAit = β0 + β1 (1 / ASSETit-1) + β2ΔSALEit + εi             (3) 
where, CA is current accruals divided by total assets at the end of year t-1; ASSET is total assets 
(Compustat item AT); ΔSALE is the change in sales (Compustat item SALE) from the prior year 
divided by total assets at the end of year t-1; ε is the regression residual.22
                                                 
22 To mitigate the influence of outliers, I winsorize CA, 1/ ASSET and ΔSALE at the 1% and 99% levels. I also 
require there be at least 20 observations in each industry and year to accurately estimate the regression coefficients.   
 Following previous 
studies (e.g., Teoh et al. 1998a; Fischer and Louis 2008; Hovakimian and Hutton 2010), current 
accruals is defined as change in non-cash current assets  (Compustat item ACT minus Compustat 
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item CHE) minus change in current liabilities (Compustat item LCT) plus change in the current 
portion of long-term debt (Compustat item DD1).  
 Equation (4) estimates expected current accruals using the coefficient estimates obtained 
from equation (3) with an adjustment for the change in accounts receivables: 
                          ECAit = ?̂?0 + ?̂?1 (1 / ASSETit-1) + ?̂?2(ΔSALEit - ΔARit)                  (4) 
where, ?̂?0, ?̂?1, and ?̂?2 are estimated coefficients from equation (3); ECA is the expected current 
accruals; ΔAR is the change in accounts receivable (Compustat item RECT) from the prior year 
divided by total assets at the end of year t-1. Discretionary current accruals (DCA) is the 
difference between current accruals and expected current accruals.  
 Finally, I adjust DCA obtained from the modified-Jones model for performance since 
Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005) show that performance-adjusted accruals are well-specified 
and yield powerful tests. Specifically, following previous studies (e.g., Louis 2004; Louis and 
Robinson 2005; Gong, Louis, and Sun 2008), for each year and each industry, I build five 
portfolios by sorting the data into quintiles based on return-on-assets (i.e., income before 
extraordinary items (Compustat item IB) divided by lagged total assets) from year -2 relative to 
the issuance year.23
 
 The performance-adjusted DCA for a sample firm is calculated as the DCA 
of the firm minus the median DCA for its respective industry-performance-matched portfolio. As 
suggested by Gong et al. (2008), the portfolio benchmarking approach allows researchers to 
control not only for performance but also for random effects stemming from other events which 
may impact accruals or other managerial incentives to engage in earnings management.  
                                                 
23 Teoh et al. (1998a) document that issuing firms report positive discretionary current accruals in year -1. Therefore, 
performance-matching based on the ROA reported in year -1 could lead to biased results. However, I reran all the 
analyses by creating matching portfolios based on the ROA reported in year -1, as well as year 0 and obtained 
similar results. 
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2.4    SAMPLE FORMATION AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
The initial sample of SEOs is obtained from the Security Data Corporation’s (SDC) New Issues 
Database for the period from 1983 to 2006. Following previous studies (e.g., Lee and Masulis 
2009; Cohen and Zarowin 2010), I exclude the following: (1) SEOs lacking Compustat annual 
financial statement data for the four years prior to the SEO filing date24
 Summary statistics are reported in Table 2.1. Panel A reports the size characteristics as of 
the end of year -1 (where year 0 is the offering year).  Panel B and C present the year and 
industry distribution, respectively. The results suggest that the sample is not dominated by a 
particular year, though 1983 stands out as a very active year for SEOs as it contains 10.88 
percent of the sample. Furthermore, examination of the industry distribution reveals that the two 
largest industry groups in the sample are computer equipment/services firms and electronic 
equipment firms, which constitute 15.02 percent and 11.19 percent of the sample, respectively. 
Panel D reports the number of issuers classified as constrained and unconstrained according to 
, (2) close-end funds, unit 
investment trusts, REITs, and limited partnerships, (3) spin-offs, (4) reverse LBOs, (5) rights 
issues, (6) pure secondary offerings, (7) simultaneous or combined offers of several classes of 
securities such as unit offers and warrants, (8) non-domestic and simultaneous domestic-
international offers, (9) offering of securities with CRSP share codes other than 10 or 11, (10) 
SEOs with offer prices less than $5. Furthermore, financial firms (SIC codes 6000-6999) and 
utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999) are excluded from the sample due to the greater regulation for 
these firms, limiting their ability to engage in earnings management. The final sample includes 
1,645 SEOs for which the accruals data are available in the year of the offering.  
                                                 
24 This restriction is likely to induce survivorship bias, resulting in the inclusion of larger and more successful firms. 
However, I expect that this will reduce the variation in the earnings management and financial constraint measures 
and thus, result in a more conservative test of my hypotheses.  
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each of the four measures of financial constraints. It also shows the extent to which different 
classifications are correlated. For example, out of the 548 issuers considered constrained 
according to the WW index, 420 are also considered constrained  according to the payout ratio 
classification, while only 93 issuers are considered unconstrained. The remaining issuers are the 
WW-constrained firms that are neither constrained nor unconstrained under the payout ratio 
classification.  
 Table 2.2 presents the median firm characteristics (as of the end of year -1) by financial 
constraints categories under each classification. The cross-sample differences between 
constrained and unconstrained issuers are in line with expectations and with prior studies in the 
literature. The results consistently suggest that financially constrained firms tend to have lower 
market value, higher market-to-book ratio and experience higher volatility of cash flows, 
revenue, and sales growth. In addition, regardless of the classification method, the median 
financially constrained firm does not pay any dividends or repurchase any shares in the pre-SEO 
year and is followed by only one analyst (two analysts under the payout ratio classification). On 
the other hand, the median unconstrained firm has positive payout activity in the year prior to the 
offering and is followed by higher number of analysts. 
 Supporting the notion that constrained firms engage in precautionary savings (e.g., Han 
and Qui 2007; Duchin 2010), cash-to-assets ratio is higher for constrained versus unconstrained 
issuers. Moreover, consistent with Whited and Wu (2006), debt-to-assets ratio decreases with 
financial constraints as constrained firms often lack resources that can be used as collateral for 
their debt. The results also reveal that Altman’s (1968) Z-score, which is a measure of the 
probability of bankruptcy (i.e., lower the Z-score, higher the probability of bankruptcy), is higher 
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for the constrained group.25
 Further, the size and SA index measures suggest that unconstrained firms report lower 
industry-adjusted ROA as compared to constrained firms, while the payout ratio measure does 
not reveal any significant difference in ROA between the two groups. However, according to the 
WW index classification, the unconstrained group reports higher industry-adjusted ROA than the 
constrained group. Finally, the results indicate that the offer size (i.e., offer amount scaled by 
pre-SEO market value) is significantly larger for the constrained group versus unconstrained 
group under all classifications.   
 This is in line with DeAngelo et al. (2010) who document that 
mature and dividend paying issuers have lower Z-scores than young and non-dividend paying 
issuers. Although this finding may seem counterintuitive, it is reassuring in that the proposed link 
between financial constraints and upward earnings management around equity offerings is 
unlikely to be an artifact of the constraint firms’ desire to avoid a potential bankruptcy.  
 
 
 
2.5    EMPIRICAL ANALYSES AND RESULTS 
 
 
2.5.1    Univariate analysis of earnings management around SEOs 
 
 
Table 2.3 (and Figure 2.1) presents time-series of performance-adjusted discretionary current 
accruals (ADJDCA), in percent, for financially constrained and unconstrained firms under 
different classifications from year -3 to +3 relative to the offering (year 0). Following previous 
studies (e.g., Rangan 1998; Shivakumar 2000; Cohen and Zarowin 2010), I focus on medians as 
they are less likely than averages to be influenced by extreme observations. However, I also 
                                                 
25 I calculate Altman’s Z-score as follows: 1.2 * Working Capital (Compustat item ACT minus LCT) / Total Assets 
+ 1.4 * Retained Earnings (Compustat item RE) / Total Assets + 3.3 * EBIT (Compustat item PI plus XINT) / Total 
Assets + 0.6 * Market Value / Total Liabilities (Compustat item LT) + 0.999 * Sales (Compustat item SALE) / Total 
Assets. 
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report means along with standard deviations to provide a more complete picture of the statistical 
distribution of discretionary accruals.  
 The results show that under all financial constraint classifications, the median ADJDCA 
reported by the constrained group in the year of the offering is significantly higher than that of 
the unconstrained group. For instance, under the firm size classification, the median ADJDCA of 
the constrained group is 4.51 percent of total assets, whereas it is 0.53 percent of total assets for 
the unconstrained group and the difference between the two groups is statistically significant at 
the 1% level. The median ADJDCA of constrained (unconstrained) firms under the payout ratio, 
WW index and SA index classifications is 2.96 percent (1.15 percent), 3.90 percent (0.85 
percent), and 4.12 percent (0.85 percent), respectively, and all the differences are significant at 
the 1% level.  These results suggest that constrained issuers manage their earnings more 
aggressively than unconstrained issuers during the year of the SEO, providing initial support for 
H1. 
 Furthermore, the comparison of the two groups’ earnings management activity in the 
years prior to the offering reveals that constrained, but not unconstrained, issuers manage their 
earnings upward in the pre-SEO period as well, albeit the magnitude of income-increasing 
accruals is smaller as compared to those in the offering year.  For instance, under the size 
classification, the median ADJDCA for the constrained group is 0.96 percent (p < 0.01) in the 
year preceding the announcement, whereas it is only 0.29 percent (p > 0.10) for the 
unconstrained group.   
 Finally, the examination of the post-offering discretionary accruals indicates that there is 
no significant difference in the financial reporting behavior of the two groups beyond the first 
year following the offering. That is, although constrained issuers continue to manage their 
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earnings in the period immediately following the offering, the difference in median ADJDCA 
between the two groups dissipates in years +2 and +3. Specifically, both groups report negative 
but insignificant ADJDCA in year +3. This finding implies that the documented divergence in 
the earnings management strategies of constrained and unconstrained firms does not manifest 
itself during the post-offering period.  
 
2.5.2    Multivariate analysis of earnings management in the SEO year  
 
  
To perform a test of H1 in a multivariate setting, I estimate the following model (separately for 
each financial constraint criterion) using median regression with bootstrapped standard errors 
(with 200 replications). Since previous studies (Rangan 1998; Teoh et al. 1998a) document that 
earnings management activity is at its peak during the offering year, I use ADJDCA calculated 
for the year of the offering as a measure of earnings management undertaken by the issuers 
around the SEO. The model includes several control variables suggested in the literature (e.g., 
Hribar and Nichols 2007; Cohen and Zarowin 2010).   
         ADJDCA = α0 + α1HIGH-FC + α2MEDIUM-FC + α3MB + α4CFVOL + α5REVVOL  
        + α6SGVOL + α7ROA + α8LEV + α9LITIGATION +α10SEO2 
                              + Year fixed effects + ν              (5) 
where, ADJDCA is the performance-adjusted discretionary current accruals (as a percentage of 
total assets) in the year of the offering; HIGH-FC is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm is 
categorized as financially constrained under a sorting criterion and 0 otherwise; MEDIUM-FC is 
a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm is ranked in the middle tercile according to a financial 
constraint sorting criterion and 0 otherwise; MB is the natural log of the market-to-book ratio in 
the year prior to the SEO year; CFVOL is the standard deviation of cash flow deflated by total 
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assets over the five year period (with a minimum of three years) prior to the SEO year;  REVVOL 
is the standard deviation of sales deflated by total assets over the five year period (with a 
minimum of three years) prior to the SEO year; SGVOL is the standard deviation of annual sales 
growth over the five year period (with a minimum of three years) prior to the SEO year; ROA is 
the industry-median adjusted return-on-assets in the year prior to the SEO year; LEV is the debt-
to-assets ratio in the year prior to the SEO year26; LITIGATION is a dummy variable equal to 1 if 
a firm’s SIC code is 2833-2836, 8731-8734, 7371-7379, 3570-3577, 3600-3674 and 0 otherwise 
(Barton and Simko 2002). The high litigation risk industries include 
pharmaceuticals/biotechnology and computers/electronics; SEO2 is a dummy variable equal to 1 
if a firm issues another SEO during the two-year period following an offering and 0 otherwise.27
 The model includes market-to-book ratio and industry-adjusted ROA to control for 
variations in issuers’ growth opportunities and profitability, respectively. I conjecture that issuers 
with higher growth opportunities and recent profitability tend to use greater income-increasing 
accruals as such firms experience severe investor reaction when they exhibit poor earnings 
performance (Skinner and Sloan 2002). In addition, I control for cash flow volatility, revenue 
volatility and sales growth volatility to ensure that the results are not driven by the more volatile 
operating environments of financially constrained firms. I also control for debt-to-assets ratio 
because previous research documents that firms use income-increasing accruals to avoid 
violating debt covenants (e.g., DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994). Further, since firms operating in 
high litigation risk industries use discretionary accruals less aggressively (Cohen and Zarowin 
  
                                                 
26 I do not control for debt-to-assets ratio when I use the WW index as the measure of financial constraints since the 
index already consists of an item measuring the firm leverage.  
27 Although it is not stated in equation (5), the natural log of the pre-offer market value is added to the model as an 
additional control variable when the payout ratio measure is used to determine the financial constraint groups. The 
reason why I do not control for the market value when other financial constraint measures are employed is that the 
market value is a proxy for the firm size, which is already captured in the other constraint measures. The Spearman 
rank (Pearson) correlation of  the natural log of the market value with assets, payout ratio, the WW index, and the 
SA index is, respectively, 0.776 (0.800), 0.185 (0.090), -0.664 (-0.693), and -0.634 (-0.651).    
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2010), the model includes an industry-based litigation dummy variable. Finally, I control for 
whether a firm issues a subsequent SEO in the two-year period following an offering. Previous 
research (e.g., Shivakumar 2000) suggests that frequent issuers may report earnings 
conservatively due to reputational concerns.  
 Table 2.4 (columns 1, 3, 5, and 7) presents the results of the median regressions. The 
results for the firm size measure are reported under column 1. As predicted, the coefficient on 
financially constrained dummy is positive (4.682) and significant at the 1% level, indicating that 
constrained issuers report higher ADJDCA in the year of SEO than unconstrained issuers. 
Similar results are obtained under other sorting criteria. Specifically, using the payout ratio, WW 
index, and SA index, respectively, reveals 1.156 (p < 0.05), 3.711 (p < 0.01), and 3.538 (p < 
0.01) percentage point difference in median ADJDCA between the constrained and 
unconstrained groups, after controlling for other factors.  Overall, the results obtained using four 
different measures support the prediction that constrained issuers manage their earnings more 
aggressively than unconstrained issuers around the offering.28
 As an additional test, I augment the regression equation (5) with the following variables: 
the natural log of the number of analysts following the company, big-N auditor dummy, low/high 
governance index dummies. However, the data availability limits the sample to 1,220 firms for 
the period 1990 and 2006. Analyst data is obtained from the First Call database and calculated as 
 Furthermore, the estimated 
coefficients on the control variables imply that firms with higher market-to-book ratio and 
industry-adjusted ROA in the pre-SEO year tend to report larger income-increasing accruals in 
the year of the offering.  However, operating in a high litigation risk industry is negatively 
associated with upward earnings management.  
                                                 
28 Estimating equation (5) with OLS and clustering standard errors at the firm level lead to qualitatively similar 
results.  
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the maximum number of analysts following the firm in the year prior to the offering. Since 
previous research (e.g., Yu 2008) documents that firms followed by more analysts manage their 
earnings less, I anticipate a negative relation between the number of analysts and income-
increasing accruals. Further, Big-N auditor dummy equals 1 if a firm’s financial statements for 
the SEO year were audited by one of the Big-8, Big-6, Big-5 or Big-4 auditors (depending on the 
sample period) and 0 otherwise.29 I expect that the issuers whose financial statements are audited 
by Big-N companies report less income-increasing accruals (Becker et al. 1998). Finally, G-
index (Gompers et al. 2003) is obtained from the RiskMetrics database. Low (High) governance 
index dummy equals 1 if a firm’s G-index is less than (greater than or equal to) nine, which is the 
sample median, and 0 otherwise. The base category for governance dummy variables includes 
the firms with missing value for the G-index (as in Bergstresser and Philippon (2006)).30
 The results of the updated median regression model are presented in columns 2, 4, 6, and 
8 of Table 2.4. The estimated coefficient on the financially constrained firm dummy is still 
positive and statistically significant under all sorting criteria. The difference in median ADJDCA 
between the two groups is 2.947 (p < 0.01), 1.148 (p < 0.05), 2.466 (p < 0.05), and 1.844 (p < 
0.10) percentage points under the size, payout ratio, WW index, and SA index, respectively. 
Furthermore, the results suggest that offering firms with higher analyst following report less 
income-increasing accruals in the SEO year. Although the estimated coefficient on the Big-N 
auditor dummy is negative, it is not statistically significant. Also, neither low nor high 
governance index dummy is significantly associated with discretionary current accruals 
 
Previous research suggests that the use of discretionary accruals is less pronounced among firms 
with lower G-index.   
                                                 
29 92 percent of the sample had their financial statements audited by Big-N auditors.   
30 G-index is available for only 23.4 percent of the firms included in the sample.  
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2.5.3    Additional multivariate analysis: controlling for CEO equity compensation  
 
    
Previous research documents that financially constrained (versus unconstrained) firms tend to 
compensate their CEOs more with options and stocks rather than cash payments (e.g., Yermack 
1995; Core and Guay 1999). Given that the use of discretionary accruals to manipulate earnings 
is more pronounced at firms where the CEO’s potential total compensation is more closely tied 
to the value of option and stock holdings (Cheng and Warfield 2005; Bergstresser and Philippon 
2006), my results can be confounded by the difference in the compensation structure of the two 
groups. To test the validity of this argument, I hand-collect the data on CEO’s option and stock 
holdings from the issuer’s last proxy statements filed prior to the offering date. I limit the sample 
period to 1997-2006 for this analysis. The reason why I hand-collect this data rather than use the 
data on Execucomp is that the sample size drops significantly when I merge the SEO and 
Execucomp datasets (small issuers are not covered by Execucomp). The final sample with CEO 
option and ownership data consists of 660 SEOs. Since the composition of the sample is different 
than that of the initial sample, I re-categorize firms into the financial constraint groups based on 
the updated terciles of each measure.  
 Consistent with prior studies, I find that constrained firms compensate their managers 
with more options. The median number of CEO’s exercisable (unexercisable) options as a 
percentage of shares outstanding prior to the offering is 1.019 percent (0.810 percent) for the 
constrained group, as compared to 0.653 percent (0.442 percent) for the unconstrained group 
according to the firm size criterion.31
                                                 
31 The results are similar under other financial constraints criteria, though the differences between the two groups do 
not reach statistical significance when the payout ratio measure is used.  
 The difference between the two groups is statistically 
significant at the 5% (1%) level. The results also indicate that the median CEO stock ownership 
in constrained firms, 2.474 percent, is significantly larger as compared to that in unconstrained 
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firms, 0.735 percent (p < 0.01).32
 To examine whether the positive relation between financial constraints and earnings 
management still holds after controlling for CEO option holdings and ownership, I augment the 
regression model (equation (5)) with the following variables: number of exercisable options (as a 
percentage of the number of shares outstanding), number of unexercisable options (as a 
percentage of the number of shares outstanding), number of shares held by the CEO (as a 
percentage of the number of shares outstanding). I also control for the CEO’s age and duality 
measured by the CEO/Chairman dummy that is equal to 1 if the CEO is also the chairman of the 
company and 0 otherwise. The results are presented in Table 2.5.  
 This finding is consistent with Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2009) 
who document that managerial ownership increases when a firm becomes financially 
constrained, since managers become more willing to accept shares instead of cash to prevent the 
firm becoming more constrained. Finally, constrained firms have younger CEOs as compared to 
unconstrained firms, though the difference in median age between the groups is only 2 years (p < 
0.01), 1 year (p > 0.40), 2.5 years (p < 0.01), and 4 years (p < 0.01) under the size, payout ratio, 
WW index, and SA index criteria, respectively.  
 The results of the median regressions suggest that after controlling for CEO option and 
stock holdings, there is still a positive relation between issuers’ financial constraint status and 
earnings management in the year of the offering. Specifically, the difference in median ADJDCA 
between the constrained and unconstrained groups is 3.115 (p < 0.01), 1.302 (p < 0.05), 2.584 (p 
< 0.01), and 2.475 (p < 0.05) percentage points under the size, payout ratio, WW index and SA 
index criteria, respectively. Although the coefficients on exercisable and unexercisable options 
are not significant in any of the models, the results reveal a positive and significant association 
                                                 
32 The WW index and SA index produce qualitatively similar results. However, the payout ratio measure suggests 
that there is no difference in the CEO ownership between the constrained and unconstrained groups.   
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between CEO ownership and earnings management. More important, these results indicate that 
the link between financial constraints and aggressive earnings management around SEOs is not 
confounded by the CEO’s equity related incentives.   
 Overall, these findings lend support for the hypothesis that the upward earnings 
management around SEOs increases in the level of issuers’ financial constraints. By using 
different financial constraint measures and regression specifications, I document that the median 
constrained issuer reports discretionary current accruals that are 1.15–4.68 percent of total assets 
higher than those reported by the median unconstrained issuer. This is inconsistent with the 
alternative hypothesis that unconstrained rather than constrained firms report more income-
increasing accruals during SEOs in anticipation of higher discounting of their stock price by 
investors. 
 
2.5.4    Univariate analysis of SEO announcement returns 
 
 
As an initial test of whether the stock market participants take the documented earnings inflation 
into account when valuing issuers’ equity, I first compare the mean announcement return of 
issuers reporting high versus low discretionary current accruals. Specifically, I sort sample firms 
into terciles based their pre-offering ADJDCA and assign those firms in the highest (lowest) 
tercile to the aggressive (conservative) earnings management category.33
                                                 
33 I measure discretionary current accruals at the time of the offering as the sum of discretionary current accruals 
over the eight quarters prior to the SEO. This is consistent with previous research (e.g., Denis and Sarin 2001). I 
calculate quarterly ADJDCA as in Gong et al. (2008). That is, using all firms with available accounting data on 
Compustat and assets greater than $1M, for each industry (two-digit SIC code) and each calendar quarter, I estimate 
the following model: CAi = β0 + ∑  4𝑗=1 βjQj,i + β5(ΔSALEi – ΔARi) + β6LCAi + εi, where CA is current accruals 
(calculated, in Compustat item names, as ΔACTQ – ΔCHEQ – ΔLCTQ + ΔDLCQ), Qj is a binary variable equal to 
1 in fiscal quarter j and 0 otherwise, ΔSALE is the quarterly change in sales, ΔAR is the quarterly change in accounts 
receivable, LCA is the lag of CA, and ε is the regression residual. All the variables are scaled by total assets at the 
beginning of the quarter. Finally, I adjust DCA obtained from the model for performance (benchmark portfolios are 
created based on return-on-assets from four quarters prior to the SEO quarter). The final sample contains 1,119 firms 
with non-missing data on ADJDCA for the eight quarters preceding the SEO announcement.  
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 Table 2.6 reports the mean cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) around initial 
announcements of SEOs. I use the SEO filing date reported on the SDC database as the 
announcement date. I calculate five-day CAR (i.e., [-2, +2]) using the market-model in which the 
CRSP value-weighted index is the measure of the market return. The estimation period starts at 
180 trading days before the announcement date and ends at 6 trading days prior to the 
announcement date (event day 0).   
 Consistent with previous studies, the average CARs shown in Table 2.6 indicate a 
negative investor reaction to offering announcements. More important, the results reveal that 
investors discount the stock prices of aggressive issuers at a higher rate as compared to 
conservative issuers, supporting H2. Specifically, the average announcement return for 
aggressive issuers is -3.70 percent, whereas conservative issuers experience an average return of 
-2.58 percent (the difference between the two groups is significant at the 5% level). In addition, 
consistent with the argument that constrained issuers cannot credibly signal the absence of 
aggressive earnings management, reporting lower discretionary accruals is associated with 
higher announcement returns for unconstrained but not constrained firms. For instance, under the 
size classification, constrained issuers engaging in conservative versus aggressive earnings 
management experience an average announcement return of -4.14 percent and -4.40 percent, 
respectively (the difference between the two groups is not statistically significant). On the other 
hand, unconstrained issuers engaging in conservative earnings management realize significantly 
higher announcement returns than those engaging in aggressive earnings management (-0.79 
percent versus -3.45 percent, p < 0.05). The results are similar under other financial constraints 
criteria.  
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2.5.5    Multivariate analysis of SEO announcement returns 
 
 
Further, I estimate the following model using OLS to test H2 in a multivariate setting: 
                CAR = λ0 + λ1CONSERVATIVE-EM+ λ2MODERATE-EM + λ3MB+ λ4MVALUE 
                             + λ5RUNUP + λ6VOLATILITY + λ7OFFERSIZE + λ8LITIGATION  
                             + Year fixed effects + η                              (6) 
where, CAR is the five-day cumulative abnormal returns around the SEO announcement date; 
CONSERVATIVE-EM is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm is categorized into the lowest 
tercile of issuers based on pre-offering ADJDCA and 0 otherwise; MODERATE-EM is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the firm is categorized into the middle tercile of issuers based on pre-
offering ADJDCA and 0 otherwise; MB is the natural log of the market-to-book ratio in the year 
prior to the SEO year; MVALUE is the natural log of the market value in the year prior to the 
SEO year; RUNUP is the cumulative abnormal returns over the period from 44 trading days 
before through 4 trading days before the offering announcement; VOLATILITY is the standard 
deviation of the market-model residuals; OFFERSIZE is the offer amount scaled by the market 
value of the firm in the year prior to the SEO year; LITIGATION is a dummy variable equal to 1 
if an issuer operates in a high litigation risk industry (as defined previously) and 0 otherwise. To 
mitigate the impact of outliers, all the continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% 
levels. Finally, the standard errors are clustered at the issuer level. The results are reported in 
Table 2.7.  
 The multivariate analysis also reveals a significant difference in SEO announcement 
returns between the conservative and aggressive issuers. Specifically, the estimated coefficient 
on the conservative dummy in the second column is 0.010 (or 1.00 percent), p < 0.10, signifying 
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that aggressive rather than conservative use of discretionary current accruals is associated with a 
greater decline in stock price at offering announcements. As for the control variables, there is a 
negative relation between announcement returns and volatility, indicating that firms with more 
volatile pre-SEO stock returns experience more negative abnormal returns when they announce 
an equity issuance. Also, the positive coefficient on market value implies that announcement 
returns increase with pre-SEO market value.    
      I also estimate the multivariate regression model separately for constrained and 
unconstrained issuers. The results again indicate that managing earnings conservatively versus 
aggressively results in higher announcement returns for unconstrained but not constrained 
issuers. In particular, for the unconstrained group, the estimated coefficient on the conservative 
dummy is 0.027 (p < 0.01), 0.015 (p < 0.10), 0.022 (p < 0.05), and 0.027 (p < 0.05) under the 
size, payout ratio, WW index, and SA index classifications, respectively. On the other hand, for 
the constrained group, the conservative dummy is insignificant and has an estimated coefficient 
ranging between 0.001 and 0.006 under the same classifications.  
 Overall, the analysis of SEO announcement returns suggests that the market participants 
adjust their valuation of issuers to reflect the stock price impact of pre-offering earnings 
management. While aggressive use of discretionary accruals in general is associated with more 
negative announcement returns, financially constrained issuers experience large negative 
announcement returns regardless of the level of earnings inflation. That is, the market 
participants conjecture greater earnings inflation by constrained issuers and adjust their valuation 
accordingly and thereby, it is only rational for constrained issuers to engage in aggressive 
earnings management.   
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2.5.6    Robustness tests 
 
 
2.5.6.1     Endogeneity    Although I find that financial constraints are positively related to 
earnings management around SEOs, the specified regression models may not fully account for 
potential endogeneity in the sample. Particularly, modeling the relation between financial 
constraints and discretionary current accruals may be problematic due to either an endogenous 
feedback from earnings quality to financial constraints or an omitted variable driving both 
financial constraints and discretionary current accruals. Although the reverse causality is a 
relevant concern when the financial constraint categories are created based on payout ratio and 
the WW index―endogenous measures of financial constraints― it is not a very valid concern 
when one uses firm size and the SA index, which are fairly exogenous measures of financial 
constraints. Nevertheless, I employ the instrumental variable (IV) approach to bolster the 
integrity of the analysis, as well as to address the omitted variable criticism. Specifically, I use 
market share (based on two-digit SIC codes) and unexpected change in the number of employees 
of issuers in the year prior to the offering as instruments for their financial constraints and re-
estimate equation (5) with 2SLS using continuous versions of each financial constraint measure 
(e.g., ln(Assets)) instead of the tercile dummy variables used in the previous analyses.34
 I calculate unexpected change in employment as in Ramanna and Roychowdhury (2010). 
 First, the 
rationale for “market share” is that constrained versus unconstrained firms lack financial 
resources required to establish and maintain a high market share (Fresard 2010). Second, the 
rationale for “change in employment” is that constrained firms tend to experience more negative 
shocks (or less positive shocks) in employment relative to unconstrained firms (Campello et al. 
2010).   
                                                 
34 To mitigate the impact of outliers, all the continuous variables used in 2SLS regressions are winsorized at the 1% 
and 99% levels.  
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Specifically, for each industry (two-digit SIC code) and each year, I estimate equation (7) using 
all firms that have necessary accounting data on Compustat and with assets greater than $1M.    
 ΔEMPit = γ0 (1 / ASSETit-1) + γ1ΔSALEit + ζit              (7) 
where, ΔEMP is the change in number of employees (Compustat item EMP) from the prior year 
divided by lagged total assets; ASSET is total assets; ΔSALE is the change in sales from the prior 
year divided by lagged total assets. The residual ζit  represents the unexpected change in firm i’s 
employment in year t.   
 Unreported correlation results reveal that, while significantly related to the financial 
constraint measures, both market share and unexpected change in employment are not 
significantly related to discretionary current accruals. The IV diagnostics also indicate that the 
results do not significantly suffer from the weak instrument problem. The F-statistic of the first-
stage IVs of ln(Assets), payout ratio, the WW index, and the SA index is 20.15, 9.73, 19.44, and 
16.19 respectively (p’s < 0.01). In addition, the p-values of the Hansen-J statistic for ln(Assets), 
payout ratio, the WW index, and the SA index is 0.876, 0.202, 0.886, and 0.678, respectively. 
This suggests that the over-identification restriction of both IVs hold under each measure of 
financial constraints.  
 The 2SLS regression results confirm the previous results. The estimated coefficient on 
ln(Assets) is -1.700 (p < 0.01), implying that one standard deviation increase in ln(Assets) results 
in a 2.668 percentage point decrease in ADJDCA reported in the SEO year. Similarly, the 
estimated coefficients on the other measures of financial constraints are statistically significant 
with expected signs: payout ratio (-34.471, p < 0.05), the WW index (33.941, p < 0.01), and the 
SA index (5.686, p < 0.01). Overall, these results cast doubt on the reverse causality and omitted 
66 
 
variable criticisms and boost confidence in the mechanism proposed by the rational expectations 
hypothesis.    
 
2.5.6.2    Sample selection bias    Following prior studies on earnings management around 
equity offerings, my sample includes only completed offerings. However, excluding firms with 
unsuccessful attempts to issue equity and focusing on those successfully raised equity may not 
provide a complete picture of the relation between corporate financial reporting and financial 
constraints imposed on firms trying to access the equity markets. Therefore, I obtain data on 
withdrawn offerings from the SDC database and perform further robustness checks using a 
combined sample of completed and canceled SEOs. The cancelled offering sample includes 144 
firms (8 percent of the combined sample35
 I assign unsuccessful (i.e., canceling) issuers into financial constraint categories using the 
terciles cutoffs of each measure obtained from the successful issuer sample. The results suggest 
that earnings management among unsuccessful issuers also increases in the level of financial 
constrains but the difference between the constrained and unconstrained groups is less 
pronounced and does not often reach statistical significance (which may partly stem from low 
) with available discretionary accruals data. Consistent 
with Clarke et al. (2001), firms canceling SEOs are smaller than successful issuers (median 
assets: $146 M vs. $175 M, p < 0.05) and experience a more negative return at offering 
announcements (median CAR[-2, +2]: -6.13 percent versus -3.09 percent, p < 0.01). In addition, 
they have slightly higher WW index (i.e., face greater financial constraints) as compared to 
successful issuers (median WW index: -0.23 versus -0.25, p < 0.01), albeit the results reveal no 
difference in the payout ratio and SA index between the two groups.  
                                                 
35 This figure is comparable to 5.3 percent reported in Clarke, Dunbar, and Kahle  (2001), who examine SEOs for 
the period from 1984 to 1996, and 10.4 percent in Altinkilic and Hansen (2003) whose sample includes SEOs issued 
between 1990 and 1997.  
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power in tests associated with the small sample size). For instance, under the size classification, 
the median ADJDCA for the constrained and unconstrained group is 2.85 percent and -0.92 
percent, respectively (p-value of the test for the difference is 0.07). Under the payout ratio, WW 
index and SA index classifications, the median issuer in the constrained (unconstrained) group 
report ADJDCA of 0.66 percent (-0.09 percent), 2.47 percent (0.38 percent), and 2.85 percent 
(0.23 percent), respectively, with p-values for the difference test greater than 0.42.   
 Further, I employ Heckman’s (1979) two-stage estimation procedure to formally test 
whether my tests suffer significantly from a sample selection bias. Specifically, the first stage, 
which uses the combined sample of successful and unsuccessful issuers, estimates a probit model 
to determine the probability that a firm will successfully issue a previously announced SEO. The 
second stage, which uses the sample of successful issuers, then estimates an OLS model of 
equation (5) augmented with the inverse mill’s ratio (or Heckman’s Lambda). The inverse mill’s 
ratio is calculated for each issuer based on the first-stage estimated values and helps control for 
the potential impact of firms’ nonrandom decision to complete an offering. The independent 
variables in the first-stage include all the variables listed in equation (5) along with two-month 
pre-SEO stock return in excess of market (i.e., value-weighted CRSP index) as an exclusion 
restriction.36
 The results of the second stage regressions are consistent with previous results. The 
estimated coefficient on constrained firm dummy (i.e., the mean difference in ADJDCA between 
the constrained and unconstrained groups) is 5.514 (p < 0.01), 1.755 (p < 0.05), 4.184 (p < 0.01), 
4.944 (p < 0.01) under the size, payout ratio, WW index, and SA index classifications, 
 Consistent with prior studies (e.g., Clarke et al. 2001), the first-stage regression 
results reveal that the probability of completing an SEO increases with pre-SEO price runup.  
                                                 
36 As Lennox, Francis, and Wang (2012) point out, using an exclusion restriction (i.e., including RUNUP in the first 
stage but not in the second stage) mitigate the concern of multicollinearity between the inverse mill’s ratio and 
second stage variables.     
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respectively. Further, the estimated coefficient on the inverse mill’s ratio is insignificant under 
each classification with p-values greater than 0.70, suggesting that sample selection bias does not 
have a significant effect on my tests.  
 
2.5.6.3    Serial issuers    Next, I turn to the question whether the documented relation between 
financial constraints and earnings management around SEOs differs between non-serial and 
serial issuers (i.e., firms that issue another SEO within the next two years of an offering). One 
might argue that reputational concerns may curb earnings management and thereby, dampen the 
difference in discretionary accruals between the constrained and unconstrained groups. To 
address this question I first estimate an updated version of equation (5) where I interact the SEO2 
dummy with High-FC and Medium-FC dummies. The results reveal no significant interaction 
between the variables under any of the constraint classifications, suggesting that the upward 
earnings management increases with financial constraints among both serial and non-serial 
issuers. Specifically, constrained (unconstrained) serial issuers report a median ADJDCA of 4.74 
percent (0.26 percent), 1.77 percent (0.72 percent), 2.72 percent (0.05 percent), 4.37 percent 
(0.60 percent) in the year of the SEO under the size, payout ratio, WW index, and SA index 
classifications, respectively. And, all the reported differences in median ADJDCA between the 
two groups are significant at least at the 10% level except under the payout ratio classification. 
These results also suggest that unconstrained serial issuers do not engage in significant earnings 
management during SEOs as none of the reported medians for this group is significant at the 
10% level (p’s > 0.20). However, one needs to be careful while interpreting these findings 
because the size of the serial issuers sample is relatively small (i.e., n = 167). Finally, it is worth 
noting that excluding the serial issuers from the sample does not qualitatively change the 
reported results in the paper.  
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2.5.6.4     Using the cash flow approach to measure current accruals    Using the balance 
sheet approach to calculate accruals may induce measurement error in accrual estimates (Hribar 
and Collins 2002). Measuring accruals directly from the statement of cash flows can correct for 
potential estimation errors but the cash flow statement data are not widely available before 1988. 
Thus, using the balance sheet approach helps preserve a larger sample covering a longer period. 
Nonetheless, I repeat all the tests with current accruals data obtained from the statement of cash 
flows. Following previous research (e.g., Beatty, Liao, and Weber 2010), I define current 
accruals as total accruals (i.e., Compustat item IBC minus OANCF) plus depreciation 
(Compustat item DP). Although using this approach reduces the sample size to 1,300, it does not 
alter any of my conclusions. In particular, re-estimations of the regression models in columns 1, 
3, 5, and 7 of Table 2.4 reveal that the difference in median ADJDCA between the constrained 
and unconstrained groups is 4.450 (p < 0.01), 1.203 (p < 0.10), 3.462 (p < 0.01), 2.608 (p < 0.05) 
percentage points under the size, payout ratio, WW index, and SA index classifications, 
respectively.  
 
 
 
2.6    SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
 
This paper examines the link between firms’ financial constraints and their financial reporting 
behavior when accessing the equity markets. Specifically, I develop and test a rational 
expectations hypothesis which posits that firms facing higher financing constraints engage in 
greater earnings management when issuing equity as a response to anticipated severe discounting 
by investors at offering announcements. By using different measures of financial constraints (i.e., 
firm size, payout ratio, the Whited and Wu (2006) index, the Size-Age index of Hadlock and 
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Pierce (2010)), I find that constrained issuers report higher income-increasing accruals around 
the offering than unconstrained issuers. The difference in performance-adjusted discretionary 
current accruals between the two groups is most pronounced at the year of the offering and then 
dissipates after the first year following the offering.  
 The results also reveal that the stock market participants correctly conjecture this 
earnings inflation and adjust issuers’ stock prices accordingly. I document that SEO 
announcement returns are significantly more negative for those issuers engaging in aggressive 
versus conservative earnings management. Further, reporting lower discretionary accruals is 
associated with higher announcement returns only for unconstrained issuers. Overall, the 
evidence suggests that the aggressive earnings management by constrained issuers is not simply 
the result of opportunistic behavior of managers but rather a preemptive strategy aimed at 
mitigating the impact of large negative announcement returns by boosting stock price via inflated 
earnings performance. 
  This study makes significant contributions to both the finance and accounting literatures 
by providing evidence that constraints on firms’ financing capacity interfere with their 
accounting decisions. In particular, firms raising outside equity alter their reporting behavior 
according to the expectations of capital market participants such that the extent to which they 
manage reported earnings upward increases in the degree of financial constraints. One immediate 
implication of this result is that building financial slack and maintaining enough borrowing 
capacity can help increase financial reporting quality. Of course, from an agency theory 
perspective, greater resources available to managers might represent reduced operational 
efficiency. But, given that less constrained firms devote fewer resources to such practices as 
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earnings management, higher financial slack and borrowing capacity can allow managers to 
operate their firms more efficiently.   
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Table 1.1 
Hypotheses and empirical predictions 
 
 Earnings Management 
Hypotheses (EMH) 
Signaling Undervaluation 
Hypotheses (SUH) 
Discretionary accruals (DA) in the 
ASR quarter Positive Positive 
Corr (DA, Repurchase size) Positive Positive 
Corr (DA, ASR announcement CARs) Negative Positive 
Corr (DA, ASR earlier in the quarter) Positive ? 
Corr (DA, Market-to-book ratio) ? Negative 
Post-ASR positive abnormal stock 
return and operating performance No Yes 
Post-ASR improvement in EPS 
performance No Yes 
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Table 1.2 
Summary statistics 
The initial sample includes 217 accelerated share repurchase (ASR) transactions announced 
between 2004 and 2007. The final sample consists of 178 observations with available accruals 
data in the announcement quarter. Information about the ASR transactions is gathered from the 
SEC filings and news stories that are identified through Factiva, ABI/INFORM, and other 
internet sources. Panel A reports the year and fiscal quarter (FQ) distribution of ASR 
announcements, as well as the median number of days between the ASR date and the end of the 
fiscal quarter. Panel B summarizes several characteristics of ASR firms including total assets 
(ATQ), market value of equity (PRCCQ x CSHOQ), market-to-book ratio ((PRCCQ x 
CSHOQ)/CEQQ), leverage ratio ((DLCQ+DLTTQ)/ATQ) and cash-to-asset ratio (CHEQ/ATQ) 
as of the end of the quarter -1 (where quarter 0 is the ASR quarter). Panel C presents descriptive 
statistics related to ASR transaction characteristics.  
 
Panel A: Time distribution   
 
  
Year N % FQ1 FQ2 FQ3 FQ4 % of FQ1,2,3 
Median # 
of days 
2004 17 9.55% 4 2 2 9 47.06% 41.0 
2005 30 16.85% 7 4 10 9 70.00% 49.0 
2006 50 28.09% 15 9 10 16 68.00% 38.5 
2007 81 45.51% 24 22 19 16 80.25% 41.0 
Total 178  50 37 41 50 71.91% 42.0 
 
Panel B: Firm Characteristics 
 
 Mean Median Q1 Q3 
Assets (in million $) 23,575.92 7,816.35 2,602.49 29,550.00 
Market Value (in million $) 13,456.22 6,225.07 3,079.25 16,741.25 
Market-to-Book 3.584 2.337 1.683 3.833 
Leverage Ratio 0.218 0.203 0.100 0.302 
Cash-to-Assets Ratio 0.119 0.063 0.025 0.159 
 
Panel C: Transaction Characteristics 
 
 Mean Median Min Max 
Amount (in million $) 608.48 250.00 18.80 12,500.00 
Percentage of Equity 5.38% 3.71% 0.16% 31.88% 
Contracts with collars 0.26 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Contracts with caps 0.12 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Contracts with floors 0.03 0.00 0.00 1.00 
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Table 1.3 
Median performance-adjusted discretionary accruals 
This table reports time-series of performance-adjusted discretionary accruals around the ASR 
announcement quarter (i.e., quarter 0). Section 3 describes the details of the estimation of 
discretionary accruals. Discretionary accruals are reported as percentage of lagged total assets. 
Thus, for instance, an accrual of 0.123 means 0.123% of total assets. The sample includes ASR 
transactions announced between 2004 and 2007, excluding firms with missing accounting data 
used to calculate discretionary accruals. Significance of tests that median performance-adjusted 
discretionary accruals are different from zero is assessed using Wilcoxon signed rank test. a, b, 
and c denote statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively.  
 
 
Quarter N 
Median  
(p-value) 
-6 167 -0.162 
  (0.353) 
-5 168 -0.301c 
  (0.090) 
-4 174 0.202 
  (0.311) 
-3 173 -0.020 
  (0.577) 
-2 174 -0.013 
  (0.836) 
-1 175 0.035 
  (0.359) 
0 178 0.442b 
  (0.023) 
1 176 -0.146 
  (0.609) 
2 173 0.303b 
  (0.031) 
3 175 -0.208c 
  (0.075) 
4 176 -0.118 
  (0.768) 
5 173 -0.096 
  (0.887) 
6 168 0.170 
  (0.259) 
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Table 1.4 
OLS and 2SLS regressions of performance-adjusted discretionary accruals in the quarter of the ASR announcement 
The dependent variable in each column is the performance-adjusted discretionary accruals (as a fraction of total assets) in the quarter 
of the ASR announcement. Percentage of equity is the percentage of outstanding equity repurchased through the ASR transaction and 
instrumented in the 2SLS using “cash-to-asset ratio” and “the imputed interest rate on borrowing the firm’s shares” (calculated as in 
Diether and Werner (2008)). ASR early in the quarter is a dummy variable equal to 1 if ASR is initiated earlier rather than later in the 
quarter (i.e., the number of days between the ASR date and the end of the fiscal quarter is greater than the sample median of 42 days) 
and 0 otherwise. Bonus is the ratio of the CEO’s bonus compensation to his/her total compensation for the year prior to the ASR 
announcement. Collared/capped contract is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the ASR contract includes a provision specifying the 
maximum post-repurchase price adjustment and 0 otherwise. Exercisable (Unexercisable) is the ratio of exercisable (unexercisable) 
options held by the CEO to the total number of shares outstanding prior to the announcement. Ownership is the percentage equity 
ownership of the CEO before the announcement. The data on CEO compensation, option holdings and ownership are hand-collected 
from the last proxy statement filed prior to the ASR announcement. Analyst is the number of analysts following the firm during the 
quarter of the ASR announcement. Industry-adjusted leverage is the firm’s leverage ratio minus the median industry leverage 
calculated at the two-digit SIC level. Litigation is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm’s SIC code is 2833-2836, 3570-3577, 3600-
3674, 7371-7379, 8731-8734 and 0 otherwise. Market value, market-to-book ratio, leverage ratio, and cash-to-asset ratio are as 
defined in Table 1.2. Independent variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. p-values are reported in parentheses and based 
on White standard errors clustered by firm. a, b, and c denote statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively. 
 
 
 OLS (1) OLS (2) OLS (3) OLS (4) 2SLS (5) 
 
Performance- 
Adjusted DA0 
Performance- 
Adjusted DA0 
Performance- 
Adjusted DA0 
Performance- 
Adjusted DA0 
Performance- 
Adjusted DA0 
      
Percentage of equity+ 0.142b   0.125b 0.460a 
      (+ instrumented in 2SLS) (0.048)   (0.042) (0.003) 
ASR early in the quarter   0.010b  0.010b 0.010c 
  (0.049)  (0.044) (0.060) 
Ln(Market-to-book)   -0.002 -0.004 0.000 
   (0.748) (0.400) (0.985) 
Bonus / Total compensation     0.035a 0.027b 
    (0.008) (0.047) 
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Collared/capped contract     0.010c 0.007 
    (0.089) (0.235) 
Exercisable options    0.697 0.334 
    (0.294) (0.594) 
Unexercisable options     -0.843 -1.184 
    (0.453) (0.368) 
Ownership    0.070 0.025 
    (0.695) (0.874) 
Ln(Market value)    0.004  0.008b 
    (0.138) (0.018) 
Analyst     -0.002a -0.002a 
    (0.002) (0.001) 
Industry-adjusted leverage     0.039c 0.023 
    (0.062) (0.332) 
Litigation    -0.013 -0.020a 
    (0.109) (0.007) 
Constant -0.004 0.001 0.008 -0.031 -0.076b 
 (0.492) (0.843) (0.187) (0.197) (0.016) 
      
Year dummies? No No No Yes Yes 
Observations 178 178 173 170 165 
Adjusted R-squared  2.49% 1.40% -0.47% 15.41% 1.62% 
      
Over-identification test (H0: Not over-identified)  p = 0.691 
F-statistic for the first stage IVs  9.92 
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Table 1.5 
Abnormal returns around the ASR announcement 
This table reports cumulative abnormal returns (in percentages) around the ASR announcement. 
Abnormal returns are calculated using the market model, in which the CRSP value-weighted 
index is the measure of market return. The market model parameters are estimated using a 
stock’s daily returns over trading days -300 to -49 prior to its ASR announcement date. Tests on 
means (medians) are based on t-test (Wilcoxon signed rank test). p-values are reported in 
parentheses. a, b, and c denote statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively. 
 
 
N 
Mean 
(p-value)  
Median 
(p-value) 
     CAR [-150, -45] 178 -0.957 -0.484 
 
  (0.200) (0.270) 
 CAR [-44, -4] 178 -0.941 -0.256 
 
  (0.198) (0.458) 
CAR [-1, +1] 178  1.368a  0.942a 
 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
   CAR [+4, +44] 178 -0.364 -0.179 
 
  (0.496)  (0.540) 
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Table 1.6 
OLS regression of ASR announcement returns 
This table presents the regression of three-day cumulative abnormal return around the ASR 
announcement on pre-repurchase discretionary accruals and control variables. Discretionary accruals 
(DA) are calculated for the quarterly earnings announcement that immediately precedes the ASR 
announcement. Positive discretionary accruals (PDA) is equal to DA if DA is greater than zero, 
otherwise PDA is zero. Negative discretionary accruals (NDA) is equal to DA if DA is less than zero, 
otherwise NDA is zero. Standard deviation of returns is calculated over trading days -300 to -49 prior 
to the ASR announcement. Prior stock return is the cumulative abnormal return over trading days -44 
and -4 prior to the ASR announcement. Illiquidity is the Amihud (2002) measure of illiquidity, which 
is calculated as the absolute price change per dollar of trading volume over the period starting 300 
trading days prior to the ASR announcement and ending 49 trading days prior to the ASR 
announcement. Other variables are as defined in Tables 1.2 and 1.4. Independent variables are 
winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. p-values are reported in parentheses and based on White 
standard errors clustered by firm. a, b, and c denote statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 
level, respectively. 
 Dependent Variable = CAR[-1, +1] 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Positive discretionary accruals in Q-1 -0.318b -0.292b -0.247b 
 (0.026) (0.047) (0.026) 
Negative discretionary accruals in Q-1 0.421 0.393 0.406c 
 (0.112) (0.130) (0.074) 
Dummy (DA in Q-1 > 0) 0.006 0.008 0.006 
 (0.350) (0.248) (0.373) 
Standard deviation of returns 2.444a 1.308 1.085 
 
(0.001) (0.202) (0.231) 
Percentage of equity   0.323
a 
 
  (0.001) 
Prior stock return   -0.005 -0.005 
 
 (0.877) (0.869) 
Ln(Market-to-book)  0.001 0.003 
 
 (0.733) (0.411) 
Ln(Market value)  -0.016b -0.001 
 
 (0.020) (0.901) 
Ln(Illiquidity)  -0.009 0.003 
 
 (0.122) (0.671) 
Cash-to-asset ratio  0.008 0.008 
 
 (0.841) (0.825) 
Constant -0.023c 0.052c 0.002 
 
(0.068) (0.084) (0.943) 
 
 
  
Year dummies?  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 175 170 170 
Adjusted R-squared 9.50% 11.41% 20.86% 
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Table 1.7 
Post-ASR long-run stock performance 
 
Panel A: 12-month period after the month of the ASR announcement  
 
 
Equally-Weighted 
 
Value-Weighted 
 
Full 
Sample High DA Low DA  
Full 
Sample High DA Low DA 
Alpha -0.005 -0.072 0.066 
 
-0.133 -0.215  -0.085 
 
(0.980) (0.699) (0.849) 
 
(0.556) (0.537)  (0.780) 
Rm - Rf   0.987a   1.020a  0.965a 
 
  0.806a   0.777a   0.926a 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
SMB   0.373a   0.266b  0.448c 
 
 0.041 -0.056  -0.026 
 
(0.009) (0.017) (0.082) 
 
(0.745) (0.717)  (0.898) 
HML   0.412a   0.561a 0.366b 
 
 0.138   0.393c  0.231 
 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.046) 
 
(0.390) (0.087)  (0.295) 
UMD -0.265a  -0.269a -0.254a 
 
 -0.158b  -0.222b -0.112 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.005) 
 
(0.030) (0.025)  (0.206) 
       Adj-R2 90.17% 89.85% 74.64% 
 
70.69% 65.69% 64.17% 
N 55 50 47 
 
55 50 47 
                
        Panel B: 24-month period after the month of the ASR announcement  
 
 
Equally-Weighted 
 
Value-Weighted 
 
Full 
Sample High DA Low DA  
Full 
Sample High DA Low DA 
Alpha -0.057 -0.118 -0.027 
 
-0.316  -0.594b -0.085 
 
(0.754) (0.595) (0.909) 
 
(0.113) (0.037)  (0.749) 
Rm - Rf   0.854a   0.881a  0.818a 
 
  0.767a   0.754a   0.769a 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
SMB   0.413a   0.497a  0.315b 
 
 0.131  0.090  0.092 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.048) 
 
(0.323) (0.627)  (0.606) 
HML   0.160b   0.197b  0.137c 
 
  0.156b   0.255b   0.112 
 
(0.025) (0.034) (0.078) 
 
(0.029) (0.011)  (0.250) 
UMD -0.248a  -0.270a -0.219b 
 
 -0.160a  -0.241a  -0.092 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.010) 
 
(0.005) (0.000)  (0.294) 
      Adj-R2 94.06% 93.21% 89.29% 
 
88.06% 84.81% 82.43% 
N 67 62 59 
 
67 62 59 
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Table 1.7 (cont’d) 
Post-ASR long-run stock performance 
This table presents the results of the Carhart (1997) four-factor calendar-time portfolio 
regressions. The dependent variable is the ASR firm portfolio returns in excess of risk-free rate. 
The intercept (“alpha”) measures the average monthly abnormal portfolio return during the 12-
month (Panel A) and 24-month (Panel B) period after the month of the ASR announcement. 
Firms with ASR quarter discretionary accruals (DA) above the sample median are classified in 
the high DA group; otherwise they are included in the low DA group. The models are estimated 
with weighted-least square regression, where the weighting vector is the number of firms in the 
relevant calendar month. p-values are reported in parentheses and based on White standard 
errors. a, b, and c denote statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
88 
 
Table 1.8 
Earnings per share (EPS) performance around the ASR announcement 
Panel A reports the quarterly EPS surprise around the ASR quarter (i.e., quarter 0). EPS surprise 
is defined as the difference between the actual EPS and the median consensus analyst estimate 
four months prior to the earnings announcement. Both actual and estimated values are obtained 
from the First Call database. Earnings surprises are measured in cents per share and winsorized 
at the 1% and 99% levels. Panels B and C report the median consensus analyst estimate around 
the ASR announcement date. Tests on means (medians) are based on t-test (Wilcoxon signed 
rank test). a, b, and c denote statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively. 
    Panel A: Quarterly EPS surprise (cents per share) around the ASR announcement quarter  
Quarter N Mean  Median Positive Negative Zero 
       -4 170   1.200   1.000c 51.18% 38.23%   10.59% 
-3 167    1.737b   1.000a 55.09% 35.93%     8.98% 
-2 169    2.083b   1.000b 53.85% 37.87%     8.28% 
-1 170  -0.212  0.000 45.88% 42.35%   11.77% 
0 175  -0.509  0.000 45.14% 44.57%   10.29% 
1 174   -2.190c  0.000 43.68% 47.13%     9.19% 
2 171   -2.725c  0.000 46.78% 43.28%     9.94% 
3 171  -6.959a  -1.000a 37.43% 54.97%     7.60% 
4 176  -7.989a  -1.000b 39.77% 51.14%     9.09% 
        
Panel B: Consensus EPS estimate (cents per share) for the ASR quarter (i.e., quarter 0) by 
analysts who constantly follow the ASR firms beginning at least 120 days before the ASR   
Last Consensus Analyst Estimate 
... Days Before/After 
 the ASR Announcement N Mean  Median 
Total # of 
Analysts per 
Firm 
(Median) 
     120 days before the ASR 165 65.697 57.000 7 
90 days before the ASR 165 65.606 56.000 7 
60 days before the ASR 165 65.145 57.000 7 
30 days before the ASR 165 63.667 55.000 7 
10 days before the ASR 165 63.339 54.000 7 
1 day before the ASR 165 63.048 54.000 7 
10 days after the ASR 165 62.818 54.000 7 
30 days after the ASR 165 62.879 54.000 7 
     
Last consensus EPS estimate 
before the earnings announcement (Q0) 
165 62.030 54.000 7 
 
  
89 
 
Table 1.8 (cont’d) 
Earnings per share (EPS) performance around the ASR announcement 
 
Panel C: Consensus EPS estimate (cents per share) for the ASR quarter (i.e., quarter 0) – no 
restriction on the analyst following period  
Last Consensus Analyst Estimate 
... Days Before/After 
 the ASR Announcement N Mean  Median 
Total # of 
Analysts per 
Firm 
(Median) 
     120 days before the ASR 174 64.069 57.500 9 
90 days before the ASR 175 64.034 57.000 9 
60 days before the ASR 175 63.646 56.000 10 
30 days before the ASR 175 62.103 54.000 11 
10 days before the ASR 176 61.716 53.500 11 
1 day before the ASR 177 61.367 53.000 11 
10 days after the ASR 177 61.446 54.000 12 
30 days after the ASR 177 61.356 53.000 12 
     
Last consensus EPS estimate 
before the earnings announcement (Q0) 
177 60.610 53.000 12 
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Table 1.9 
Quarterly median operating performance around the ASR announcement 
Operating performance is measured by operating income scaled by the average of cash-adjusted 
total assets (i.e., total assets minus cash and cash equivalents) at the beginning and end of the 
quarter. Panel A reports unadjusted, industry-adjusted (i.e., firm’s operating performance minus 
the median industry performance), and performance-adjusted operating performance (calculated 
using Lie’s (2005) matching procedure). Panel B reports changes in unadjusted, industry-
adjusted, and performance-adjusted operating performance. All numbers are in percentages. 
Significance of tests that levels of and changes in median operating performance are different 
from zero is assessed using Wilcoxon signed rank test. a, b, and c denote statistical significance 
at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Levels of median operating performance (%) 
   
 
Quarter  N  Unadjusted  
Industry-
Adjusted 
 
Performance-
Adjusted 
         
-4  174  3.675a  0.675
a    0.080
a 
-3  173  3.294a  0.623
a  -0.003 
-2  173  3.360a  0.467
a  -0.016 
-1  173  3.324a  0.596
a  -0.031 
0  174  3.476a  0.675
a  -0.006 
1  170  3.236a  0.609
a  -0.022 
2  167  3.292a  0.625
a  -0.006 
3  169  3.245a  0.796
a   0.059 
4  170  3.520a  0.794
a   0.025 
         
 
Panel B: Median changes in operating performance (%) 
   
 
Quarter  N  Unadjusted  
Industry-
Adjusted 
 
Performance-
Adjusted 
         
0 to +1  170  -0.010   0.004   0.026 
0 to +2  166  -0.002   0.040  -0.010 
0 to +3  167   0.011   0.019   0.069 
0 to +4  168  -0.016   0.042   0.072 
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Table 2.1 
Summary statistics 
The sample includes 1,645 seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) over the period 1983 to 2006. Panel 
A reports pre-SEO size characteristics. All monetary variables are adjusted for inflation and 
represent millions of 2006 constant dollars. Total assets are end of period book assets in the year 
prior to the SEO. Market value is calculated as the closing price at the fiscal year-end 
(Compustat item PRCC_F) times the number of shares outstanding (Compustat item CSHO) in 
the year prior to the SEO. Market-to-book ratio is calculated as the market value of equity 
divided by the book value of common equity (Compustat item CEQ). Offer amount is the dollar 
amount of the SEO filed by the issuer. Panel B reports the yearly distribution. Panel C presents 
the industry distribution. Panel D displays the cross-classifications of financial constraint types.  
 
Panel A: Size characteristics  
  Total assets ($M) Market value ($M) M/B ratio Offer amount ($M) 
Median 175.86 221.87 2.499 66.86 
Std. dev. 2,003.97 1,359.31 3.763 141.11 
 
Panel B: Time distribution       
Year Freq % Cum Freq % 
1983 179 10.88 179 10.88 
1984 27 1.64 206 12.52 
1985 53 3.23 259 15.74 
1986 63 3.83 322 19.57 
1987 52 3.16 374 22.74 
1988 18 1.09 392 23.83 
1989 33 2.01 425 25.84 
1990 35 2.13 460 27.96 
1991 111 6.75 571 34.71 
1992 75 4.56 646 39.27 
1993 76 4.62 722 43.89 
1994 50 3.04 772 46.93 
1995 96 5.84 868 52.77 
1996 115 6.99 983 59.76 
1997 98 5.96 1,081 65.71 
1998 47 2.86 1,128 68.57 
1999 60 3.65 1,188 72.22 
2000 69 4.19 1,257 76.41 
2001 43 2.61 1,300 79.03 
2002 59 3.59 1,359 82.61 
2003 87 5.29 1,446 87.90 
2004 79 4.80 1,525 92.71 
2005 57 3.47 1,582 96.17 
2006 63 3.83 1,645 100.00 
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Table 2.1 (cont’d) 
Summary statistics 
 
Panel C: Industry (two-digit SIC code) distribution 
      
Industry Codes Freq          % 
Mining, oil, and gas 10, 13 127 7.72% 
Food products 20 25 1.52% 
Paper and paper products 24, 25, 26, 27 50 3.04% 
Chemical products 28 179 10.88% 
Manufacturing 30, 31, 32, 33, 34 83 5.05% 
Computer equipment and services 35, 73 247 15.02% 
Electronic equipment 36 184 11.19% 
Transportation 37, 39, 40, 42, 44, 45 123 7.48% 
Scientific instruments 38 161 9.79% 
Communications 48 39 2.37% 
Durable goods 50 78 4.74% 
Retail 53, 54, 56, 57, 59 96 5.84% 
Eating and drinking establishments 58 36 2.19% 
Entertainment services 70, 78, 79 37 2.25% 
Health 80 53 3.22% 
All others 16, 22, 23, 29, 47, 51, 52, 
55, 82, 87, 99 
127 7.72% 
 
Panel D: Cross-classification of financial constraint types 
 
 
Firm Size 
 
Payout Ratio 
 
The WW Index 
 
The SA Index 
C 
 
UC 
 
C 
 
UC 
 
C 
 
UC 
 
C 
 
UC 
Firm Size 
               Constrained (C) 548               
Unconstrained (UC)   548             
                
Payout Ratio                
Constrained (C) 360  174  826           
Unconstrained (UC) 118  266    548         
 
               
The WW Index                
Constrained (C) 424  4  420  82  548       
Unconstrained (UC) 9  434  94  332    548     
 
               
The SA Index                
Constrained (C) 449  0  382  101  417  11  548   
Unconstrained (UC) 10  404  146  288  26  409    548 
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Table 2.2 
Summary statistics (medians) for the sample firms partitioned by their financial constraint status 
 
 
Size Payout Ratio The Whited-Wu Index The Size-Age Index 
 
C Mid UC C Mid UC C Mid UC C Mid UC 
Firm Characteristics 
            Assets ($M) 44.84 175.86 958.39a 109.29 221.21 327.61a 50.59 175.96 921.16a 47.37 207.18 798.13a 
Market value ($M) 80.33 210.15 801.19a 180.15 247.70 287.93a 94.47 201.68 700.68a 94.47 240.22 602.46a 
Market-to-book ratio 3.336 2.520 1.877a 3.020 2.274 1.941a 3.341 2.466 1.880a 3.551 2.374 1.860a 
Cash-to-assets ratio 0.157 0.071 0.036a 0.118 0.041 0.049a 0.163 0.072 0.036a 0.175 0.069 0.036a 
Debt-to-assets ratio 0.112 0.227 0.336a 0.194 0.295 0.267a 0.110 0.248 0.314a 0.108 0.246 0.320a 
Z-score 5.254 3.906 2.540a 4.208 3.614 3.209a 4.974 3.843 2.738a 5.431 3.753 2.683a 
Cash flow volatility  0.072 0.043 0.028a 0.058 0.033 0.032a 0.083 0.039 0.026a 0.078 0.037 0.028a 
Revenue volatility  0.213 0.165 0.127a 0.190 0.156 0.146a 0.206 0.165 0.128a 0.219 0.165 0.126a 
Sales growth volatility  0.272 0.209 0.177a 0.267 0.180 0.173a 0.275 0.208 0.168a 0.294 0.220 0.157a 
Industry-adjusted ROA (%) 3.439 2.474 1.585a 1.966 4.011  1.869 1.475 3.230 2.008a 3.299 2.648 1.574c 
Payout ratio 0.000 0.000  0.051a 0.000 0.025 0.184a 0.000 0.000 0.087a 0.000 0.000 0.068a 
Number of analysts 1.000 3.000 5.000a 2.000 3.000   3.000a 1.000 2.000 4.000a 1.000 3.000 4.000a 
             Offering Characteristics 
            Offer amount ($M) 23.65 45.60 97.65a 45.50 43.10 54.70a  29.55 46.90  80.35a 27.90 49.50 76.30a 
Offer amount / Market value 0.422 0.304 0.174a 0.316 0.270 0.244a 0.410 0.304 0.178a 0.406 0.280 0.191a 
SEO within 2 years (mean %) 9.12 12.02  9.31a   8.58 12.92 10.29a 9.12 9.47 11.86a 8.94 10.93 10.58a 
             CEO Characteristics 
            Stock ownership (%) 2.474 2.043 0.735a 1.320 1.749   1.782 1.637 2.457   1.113 2.469 2.446 0.781a 
Exercisable options (%) 1.019 0.819 0.653b 0.965 0.749   0.672 1.102 0.711 0.552a 1.000 0.581  0.824 
Unexercisable options (%) 0.810 0.576 0.442a 0.621 0.418   0.485 0.876 0.584 0.400a 0.794 0.576 0.448a 
Age 52.00 53.00   54.00a 52.00 53.50   53.00 51.00 54.00   53.50a 51.00 53.00 55.00a 
 
† a, b, and c denote the statistical significance of the difference in median firm, offering, and CEO characteristics between unconstrained (UC) and constrained 
(C) firms.  
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Table 2.2 (cont’d) 
Summary statistics (medians) for the sample firms partitioned by their financial constraint 
status 
This table reports the median firm characteristics (in the year prior to the offering) by financial 
constraint categories. Financial constraint status is determined based on four different measures: 
(1) firm size measured by total assets, (2) payout ratio, (3) the Whited and Wu (2006) index, (4) 
the Size-Age index of Hadlock and Pierce (2010). The procedure of categorizing firms into the 
financial constraint groups is described in section 3.1. The columns labeled as C, Mid, and UC 
represent the categories of financially constrained, moderately financially constrained, and 
financially unconstrained firms, respectively. Assets, market value, and M/B ratio are as defined 
in Table 2.1. Cash-to-assets ratio is cash (Compustat item CASH) divided by total assets in the 
year preceding the SEO. Debt-to-assets ratio is total debt (Compustat item DLC plus DLLT) 
divided by total assets in the year preceding the SEO. Altman’s (1968) Z-score is a measure of 
probability of bankruptcy and calculated as follows: 1.2 * Working Capital (Compustat item 
ACT minus LCT) / Total Assets + 1.4 * Retained Earnings (Compustat item RE) / Total Assets + 
3.3 * EBIT (Compustat item PI plus XINT) / Total Assets + 0.6 * Market Value / Total 
Liabilities (Compustat item LT) + 0.999 * Sales (Compustat item SALE) / Total Assets. Cash 
flow volatility is the standard deviation of cash flow (Compustat item IB plus Compustat item 
DP) deflated by total assets over the five year period (with a minimum of three years) prior to the 
SEO year. Revenue volatility is the standard deviation of sales deflated by total assets over the 
five year period (with a minimum of three years) prior to the SEO year. Sales growth volatility is 
the standard deviation of annual sales growth over the five year period (with a minimum of three 
years) prior to the SEO year. ROA is the income before extra ordinary items (Compustat item 
IB) as a percentage of lagged total assets. Industry-adjusted ROA is the firm’s ROA minus the 
industry-median ROA. Payout ratio is defined as the ratio of dividends (Compustat item DVC 
plus Compustat item DVP) plus share repurchases (Compustat item PRSTKC) to operating 
income (Compustat item OIBDP). Payout ratio is set equal to 1 if a firm has negative operating 
income and positive payout. Number of analysts is the maximum number of analysts following 
the firm in the year prior to the offering and obtained from the First Call database for the period 
over 1990-2006. SEO2 (“SEO within 2 years) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm issues 
another SEO during the two-year period following an offering and 0 otherwise. The data on 
CEO’s option holdings and stock ownership are hand-collected from the last proxy statement 
filed by the issuers prior to the offering. This sample consists of 660 offerings (over the period 
1997 to 2006) with available proxy statements on the SEC’s website. Ownership is calculated as 
the number of shares held by the CEO divided by the number of shares outstanding prior to the 
offering. Exercisable (unexercisable) represents the number of exercisable (unexercisable) 
options held by the CEO divided by the number of shares outstanding prior to offering. Age is 
the CEO’s age. The differences in firm characteristics between the constrained and 
unconstrained groups are tested using Wilcoxon signed rank test. a, b, and c denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
95 
 
Table 2.3 
Performance-adjusted discretionary current accruals around SEOs by financial constraint 
status 
This table reports time-series of median and mean performance-adjusted discretionary current 
accruals (ADJDCA), as a percentage of total assets, from year -3 to year +3 relative to the 
seasoned equity offering (i.e., year 0). Financial constraint status is determined based on four 
different measures (i.e., firm size, payout ratio, the Whited-Wu index, and the Size-Age index) in 
the year prior to the offering. See section 3.1 for details of the procedure used to categorize firms 
into the financial constraint groups. Significance of tests that median (mean) DCA are different 
from zero is assessed using Wilcoxon signed rank test (t-test). Reported means and standard 
deviations are based on values winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. a, b, and c denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 
  Year -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
                                Performance-adjusted discretionary current accruals 
Panel A: Firm size       
Constrained (C) Median 0.88a 1.03a 0.96a 4.51a 1.94a 0.73b -0.22 
 Mean  2.10a 2.35a 2.48a 6.28a 2.07a 0.77c -0.21 
 Std Dev 14.82 13.82 13.78 15.55 11.03 10.32 9.53 
 N 545 545 545 548 523 494 456 
         
Unconstrained (UC) Median 0.07 -0.49 0.29 0.53a 0.52b 0.10 -0.43b 
 Mean 0.32 0.01 0.59 1.31a 0.52c 0.03 -0.83a 
 Std Dev 9.02 7.90 8.93 8.25 7.04 6.66 6.28 
 N 539 543 546 548 522 496 468 
 p-value (C ≠ UC) 0.0592 0.0029 0.0186 <0.0001 0.0030 0.0515 0.3051 
         
Panel B: Payout ratio        
Constrained (C) Median  0.60b  0.95a  0.62a  2.96a  1.25a  0.49c -0.02 
 Mean  1.42a 1.82a 1.51a 4.41  1.58a 0.50 -0.28 
 Std Dev 13.56 12.34 12.27 13.28 9.45 9.01  8.35 
 N 816 820 824 826 787 734 674 
         
Unconstrained (UC) Median  0.36c -0.60 0.41  1.15a 0.25 -0.02 -0.18 
 Mean   1.38a 0.19  0.99b 2.50 0.43 0.21 -0.34 
 Std Dev 10.32 9.82 10.12 10.94 8.15 7.74 7.57 
 N 540 540 544 548 525 496 460 
 p-value (C ≠ UC) 0.7398 0.0013 0.1944 0.0015 0.0122 0.3711 0.5541 
         
Panel C: The Whited and Wu index       
Constrained (C) Median  0.88a  1.39a  0.61a 3.90a 1.32a 0.31 -0.26 
 Mean   1.99a  2.53a  1.39b 5.52a 1.81a 0.27 -0.25 
 Std Dev 14.51 13.17 12.90 15.35 10.83 10.24 9.37 
 N 544 546 546 548 520 493 452 
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Table 2.3 (cont’d) 
Performance-adjusted discretionary current accruals around SEOs by financial constraint status 
 
 
Unconstrained (UC) Median -0.08 -0.50 0.38  0.85a  0.42b -0.06 -0.16 
 Mean 0.62 0.12  0.98b 1.92a  0.59c 0.04 -0.18 
 Std Dev 8.99 8.57 9.77 8.74 7.14 6.90 6.48 
 N 537 540 546 548 527 497 469 
 p-value (C ≠ UC) 0.0653 0.0003 0.4803 <0.0001 0.0317 0.4684 0.7793 
         
Panel D:  The Size-Age index  
Constrained (C) Median  0.91a  1.02a 0.82a  4.12a  1.29a  0.78c -0.13 
 Mean  3.01a  2.67a 2.37a 6.07a 1.60a 0.66 -0.23 
 Std Dev 15.67 14.59 13.56 15.25 10.98 10.46  9.38 
 N 544 544 545 548 516 487 444 
         
Unconstrained (UC) Median 0.22 -0.55  0.64a 0.85a  0.47b -0.01 -0.26 
 Mean  0.56  0.09 1.15a 1.98a 0.59c 0.08 -0.35 
 Std Dev 8.03  7.50 8.43 9.25 7.34 6.34 6.45 
 N 542  545 547 548 528 503 473 
 p-value (C ≠ UC) 0.0169  0.0037 0.2368 <0.0001 0.0547 0.1135 0.6908 
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Table 2.4 
Median regression of performance-adjusted discretionary current accruals in the year of the offering 
This table presents the results of the median regression of performance-adjusted discretionary current accruals (ADJDCA), as a 
percentage of total assets, in the SEO year. The sample includes 1,645 offerings over the period 1983 to 2006. Each column is labeled 
with the financial constraint measure (i.e., firm size, payout ratio, the Whited-Wu (WW) index, and the Size-Age (SA) index) used to 
categorize the sample firms as constrained and unconstrained in the year prior to the offering (year -1). High-FC is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if a firm is categorized as financially constrained under a sorting criterion and 0 otherwise. Medium-FC is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if a firm is ranked in the middle tercile according to a financial constraint criterion and 0 otherwise. Litigation is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm is in one of the following industries: pharmaceutical/biotech (SIC codes: 2833-2836, 8731-8734), 
computer (3570-3577, 7371-7379), or electronics (3600-3674) and 0 otherwise. Big-N auditor is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
firm’s annual report is audited by one of the Big-8, Big-6, Big-5 or Big-4 auditors depending on the year of the observation and 0 
otherwise. Low (High) Governance Index is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm’s G-index is less than (greater than or equal to) 
nine and 0 otherwise. Firms with missing G-index constitute the base category for the G-index dummy variables. Other variables are 
as defined in Tables 2.1 and 2.2. p-values are reported in parentheses and based on bootstrapped standard errors with 200 replications. 
a, b, and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
 Size Size Payout Payout WW index WW index SA index SA index 
Sample Period 83-06 90-06 83-06 90-06 83-06 90-06 83-06 90-06 
         
High-FC 4.682a 2.947a 1.156b 1.148b 3.711a 2.466b 3.538a 1.844c 
 (0.000) (0.006) (0.023) (0.037) (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) (0.051) 
Medium-FC 1.488b 0.712 -0.498 -0.368 0.887c 0.781 0.877 0.729 
 (0.031) (0.376) (0.428) (0.657) (0.080) (0.274) (0.127) (0.212) 
Ln(Market-to-book) 0.495 1.116b 1.465a 1.740a 0.675c 1.104b 0.427 1.008b 
 (0.233) (0.022) (0.000) (0.000) (0.062) (0.010) (0.331) (0.039) 
Cash flow volatility -0.569 1.505 0.429 2.079 1.380 1.901 -0.409 2.104 
 (0.889) (0.715) (0.905) (0.579) (0.691) (0.615) (0.921) (0.600) 
Revenue volatility  -0.087 -0.866 -0.439 -1.848 0.332 -0.841 0.343 -1.186 
 (0.959) (0.659) (0.777) (0.337) (0.836) (0.655) (0.839) (0.533) 
Sales growth volatility  -0.930 -1.329b -0.903c -0.935c -0.642 -1.168b -0.858 -1.438b 
 (0.113) (0.010) (0.079) (0.068) (0.227) (0.018) (0.123) (0.011) 
Industry-adjusted ROA 0.063a 0.063a 0.073a 0.072a 0.080a 0.074a 0.070a 0.063a 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
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Litigation  -1.398c -1.516c -1.596b -1.903b -1.436b -1.806b -1.136 -1.228 
 (0.071) (0.052) (0.024) (0.015) (0.044) (0.030) (0.101) (0.120) 
SEO in 2 years -0.222 -0.150 0.172 0.031 0.037 0.188 -0.056 0.014 
 (0.756) (0.839) (0.815) (0.967) (0.955) (0.807) (0.942) (0.986) 
Debt-to-assets ratio 1.099 1.413 -0.807 0.155   -1.151 0.980 
 (0.553) (0.427) (0.571) (0.917)   (0.487) (0.518) 
Ln(Market Value)   -1.128a -1.009a     
   (0.000) (0.004)     
Ln(1 + Analyst)  -0.988b  -0.903c  -1.153a  -1.495a 
  (0.014)  (0.078)  (0.004)  (0.001) 
Big-N auditor   -1.687  -1.454  -1.413  -1.643 
  (0.149)  (0.203)  (0.321)  (0.189) 
Low governance index   0.614  0.839  0.446  0.544 
  (0.462)  (0.312)  (0.594)  (0.542) 
High governance index   -0.652  0.431  -0.642  -0.743 
  (0.382)  (0.621)  (0.381)  (0.340) 
Constant -0.195 6.038b 8.369a 10.598a 0.875 6.663b 1.487 6.227b 
 (0.868) (0.050) (0.000) (0.003) (0.334) (0.026) (0.149) (0.048) 
         
Year dummies? Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,645 1,220 1,645 1,220 1,645 1,220 1,645 1,220 
Pseudo R-squared 0.037 0.044 0.041 0.046 0.033 0.043 0.032 0.040 
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Table 2.5 
Median regression of performance-adjusted discretionary current accruals in the year of 
the offering (controlling for CEO equity incentives) 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
 Size Payout WW index SA index 
     
High-FC 3.115a 1.302b 2.584a 2.475b 
 (0.003) (0.034) (0.004) (0.031) 
Medium-FC 1.061 0.028 0.254 0.931 
 (0.149) (0.974) (0.715) (0.205) 
Ownership 0.069b 0.054b 0.069a 0.059b 
 (0.015) (0.044) (0.007) (0.022) 
Exercisable  0.120 0.199 0.211 0.146 
 (0.530) (0.332) (0.299) (0.485) 
Unexercisable 0.197 0.199 0.191 0.331 
 (0.636) (0.650) (0.622) (0.419) 
CEO/Chairman -0.288 0.215 -0.169 -0.100 
 (0.621) (0.714) (0.764) (0.866) 
Ln(Age) 3.286 1.635 2.344 3.321 
 (0.183) (0.448) (0.300) (0.151) 
Ln(Market-to-book) 1.052b 1.633a 1.001b 0.833c 
 (0.030) (0.001) (0.033) (0.073) 
Cash flow volatility 0.338 1.382 1.362 1.055 
 (0.939) (0.749) (0.739) (0.830) 
Revenue volatility  0.294 0.437 1.193 0.661 
 (0.861) (0.795) (0.456) (0.737) 
Sales growth volatility  -1.126 -1.048 -0.707 -0.956 
 (0.152) (0.146) (0.279) (0.248) 
Industry-adjusted ROA 0.055b 0.062b 0.061a 0.055b 
 (0.024) (0.012) (0.006) (0.030) 
Litigation  -2.063b -2.062b -2.114b -2.248b 
 (0.022) (0.014) (0.012) (0.014) 
SEO in 2 years -0.003 0.007 -0.021 0.214 
 (0.998) (0.994) (0.983) (0.819) 
Debt-to-assets ratio 0.572 -0.630  -0.624 
 (0.745) (0.664)  (0.729) 
Ln(Market value)  -0.752b   
  (0.028)   
Constant -12.753 -2.746 -8.973 -12.576 
 (0.191) (0.747) (0.303) (0.172) 
     
Year dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 660 660 660 660 
Pseudo R-squared 0.049 0.054 0.047 0.045 
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Table 2.5 (cont’d) 
Median regression of performance-adjusted discretionary current accruals in the year of 
the offering (controlling for CEO equity incentives). 
This table presents the results of the median regression of performance-adjusted discretionary 
current accruals (ADJDCA), as a percentage of total assets, in the SEO year. The data on CEO’s 
stock and option holdings are hand-collected from the last proxy statement filed by the issuers 
prior to the offering. The sample consists of 660 offerings (over the period 1997 to 2006) with 
available proxy statements on the SEC’s website. CEO/Chairman is a dummy variable equal to 1 
if the CEO is also the chairman of the company and 0 otherwise. Other variables are as defined 
in Tables 2.1, 2.2, and 2.4. p-values are reported in parentheses and based on bootstrapped 
standard errors with 200 replications. a, b, and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
 
  
101 
 
Table 2.6 
SEO announcement returns by earnings management strategy and financial constraint 
status 
This table presents mean five-day cumulative abnormal returns (in percentages) centered around 
the SEO announcement date. Sample firms are independently sorted into terciles based on pre-
SEO performance-adjusted discretionary current accruals (ADJDCA) and financial constraint 
measures. Firms in the lowest, middle, and highest discretionary accruals tercile are assigned to 
the conservative, moderate, and aggressive earnings management category, respectively. The 
procedure of categorizing firms into the financial constraint groups is described in section 3.1. 
Abnormal returns are calculated using the market model, in which the CRSP value-weighted 
index is the measure of market return. The market model parameters are estimated by OLS using 
a firm’s daily returns over trading days -180 to -6 prior to its SEO announcement date. 
Significance of tests that the difference in mean cumulative abnormal returns between the 
conservative and aggressive groups is different from zero is assessed using t-test. a, b, and c 
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: All firms  
 
Earnings Management Strategy   
 
Conservative  Moderate Aggressive Difference (C-A) 
All firms  -2.584 -3.036 -3.702   1.118b 
 
  
Panel B: Size classification  
 
 
 
 
 
Conservative Moderate Aggressive Difference (C-A) 
Unconstrained  -0.792 -1.922 -3.453   2.661b 
Constrained -4.140 -3.735 -4.399 0.259 
  
 
 
 
 
Panel C: Payout classification  
 
 
 
 
 
Conservative Moderate Aggressive Difference (C-A) 
Unconstrained  -1.810 -2.071 -3.440  1.630c 
Constrained -3.371 -3.980 -4.022 0.651 
  
 
 
 
 
Panel C: The Whited-Wu index classification  
 
 
 
 
 
Conservative Moderate Aggressive Difference (C-A) 
Unconstrained  -1.278 -1.588 -3.373  2.095b 
Constrained -3.604 -3.653 -4.358 0.754 
  
 
 
 
 
Panel D: The Size-Age index classification  
 
 
 
 
 
Conservative Moderate Aggressive Difference (C-A) 
Unconstrained  -1.154 -2.025 -3.752   2.598a 
Constrained -4.403 -3.106 -4.176 -0.227 
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Table 2.7 
OLS regression of SEO announcement returns 
This table presents the results of OLS regression of five-day cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) around the SEO announcement date. 
Runup is the CAR over the period from 44 trading days before through 4 trading days before the SEO announcement. Volatility is the 
standard deviation of the market-model residuals. Other variables are as defined in Tables 2.4 and 2.6. To mitigate the impact of 
outliers, all the continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. p-values are reported in parentheses and based on 
White standard errors clustered by firm. a, b, and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable = CAR[-2, +2] 
 All  Size  Payout  WW Index  SA Index 
    UC C  UC C  UC C  UC C 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8)  (9) (10) 
               
Conservative EM  0.011b  0.010c   0.027a  0.001   0.015c  0.004 
 
 0.022b  0.006   0.027b  0.004 
 (0.036) (0.080)  (0.002) (0.913)  (0.100) (0.592)  (0.015) (0.575)  (0.015) (0.725) 
Moderate EM 0.005 0.006   0.013c -0.006  -0.001  0.004  0.003 -0.001  0.010 -0.012 
 (0.342) (0.265)  (0.072) (0.657)  (0.923) (0.556)  (0.637) (0.922)  (0.141) (0.313) 
Ln(Market-to-book)  0.000  0.003 0.000  -0.006 0.002  -0.001 -0.003   0.006  0.004 
  (0.936)  (0.635) (0.984)  (0.353) (0.683)  (0.813) (0.679)  (0.281) (0.648) 
Ln(Market value)   0.004c  0.000 0.010  -0.002 0.008  -0.001  0.013c  0.001  0.003 
  (0.072)  (0.902) (0.255)  (0.618) (0.058)  (0.790) (0.075)  (0.877) (0.714) 
Runup  -0.062  -0.041 -0.010  -0.050 -0.003  -0.021 -0.027  -0.024  0.007 
  (0.277)  (0.207) (0.653)  (0.133) (0.858)  (0.457) (0.239)  (0.417) (0.750) 
Volatility  -0.454c  -0.778c 0.081  -1.017b 0.271  -0.658c 0.292  -0.649 0.364 
  (0.084)  (0.093) (0.868)  (0.037) (0.447)  (0.087) (0.528)  (0.158) (0.386) 
Offer size  -0.001  -0.002 0.003  -0.018 0.002  -0.007 -0.002  -0.005 -0.008 
  (0.916)  (0.928) (0.889)  (0.286) (0.879)  (0.691) (0.929)  (0.751) (0.626) 
Litigation  -0.001  -0.004 0.003   0.001 -0.004  0.008 -0.001  0.001 -0.001 
  (0.817)  (0.746) (0.782)  (0.910) (0.606)  (0.507) (0.928)  (0.896) (0.962) 
Constant -0.024 -0.036   0.002 -0.081   0.014 -0.064  -0.004 -0.105  -0.010 -0.070 
 (0.000) (0.054)  (0.956) (0.071)  (0.627) (0.050)  (0.878) (0.009)  (0.719) (0.081) 
               
Year dummies? Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 1,119 1,119  373 372  373 560  372 373  373 373 
R-squared 0.024 0.043  0.131 0.071  0.147 0.050  0.139 0.089  0.142 0.093 
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Figure 2.1 
Earnings management around SEOs by financial constraint status 
This figure plots median performance-adjusted discretionary current accruals (ADJDCA), as a percentage of total assets, for 
constrained and unconstrained issuers from year -3 to year +3 relative to the seasoned equity offering (i.e., year 0).  
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